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[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and 
repose is not the destiny of man.1 
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
HE Supreme Court’s October Term 2009 was a banner one for 
federal jurisdiction buffs. Even apart from its usual handful of 
standing cases, the Court decided no fewer than eight cases that di-
rectly implicated questions of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction.2 
 
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 
(1897). 
2 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (considering 
jurisdictionality of questions of the extraterritorial reach of a statute); Dolan v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2538–39 (2010) (determining jurisdictionality of the 
ninety-day deadline to order restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (2006)); United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 
1367, 1379 (2010) (assessing jurisdictionality of the precondition to a bankruptcy dis-
charge of a student loan debt that the court find “undue hardship”); Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245–47 (2010) (analyzing jurisdictionality of 17 
U.S.C. § 411(a)); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1194–95 (2010) (considering 
how to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for diversity citizenship 
purposes); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 833–40 (2010) (examining appellate ju-
risdiction over discretionary actions by the Attorney General in immigration proceed-
ings); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
T 
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In each case, the Court adopted rules regarding jurisdiction that 
were founded upon the value of clarity. For example, in Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, the Court chose a simplified factual test for corpo-
rate citizenship under the diversity-jurisdiction statute.3 The Court 
intentionally opted for that particular test because of the need for 
clear and simple jurisdictional rules, a need that the Court and its 
members have recognized in past Terms as well.4 
There are good reasons to applaud the Court’s push for clarity in 
areas of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jurisdictional uncertainty 
causes litigants and courts to spend time and resources establishing 
the propriety of the forum when they might be better spent litigat-
ing the merits. Uncertainty also leads to mistaken jurisdictional as-
sumptions and exercises of authority, which, if later discovered, 
will undo all of the effort expended in that improper forum. For 
these reasons, one commentator recently asserted that “[j]ust 
about nobody, it seems, thinks that jurisdictional rules should be 
fuzzy.”5 
Call me a skeptic. Although I generally agree with the value of 
jurisdictional clarity as an ideal, the reality is that jurisdictional 
clarity is largely a chimera, done in by its own inherent complexi-
ties. Worse, these complexities are either missed or ignored, lead-
ing to the routine assumptions that clarity in jurisdictional rules is 
both attainable and an unalloyed good. This Article calls those as-
sumptions into question and offers a more refined understanding 
of the surprising complexity and obscurity of jurisdictional clarity. 
It does so in five parts. 
Part I makes and defends the descriptive claim that there is a 
wide gap between the rhetoric of courts and commentators favor-
ing clarity and simplicity in areas of subject-matter jurisdiction and 
the pervasive uncertainty in those doctrines today. In other words, 
although judges and commentators often invoke jurisdictional clar-
 
Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 595–96 (2009) (deciding jurisdictionality of the Railway 
Labor Act’s conference requirement); Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 
606–07 (2009) (assessing appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a 
privilege order). 
3 Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
5 John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
145, 167 (2006). 
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ity and appear committed to it, jurisdictional doctrine is, in many 
instances, neither clear nor simple. Reality defies ideality. 
Part II then turns to the nature of jurisdictional clarity and situ-
ates it within two great conversations on jurisdictional doctrine: the 
ageless debate between rules and standards and the more recent, 
but no less rich, debate between mandatory and discretionary ju-
risdiction, most prominently forged by Martin Redish and David 
Shapiro. This Part argues analytically that these debates are related 
to, but mostly dissociated from, the push for jurisdictional clarity. 
A standard, for example, can be clear, while a rule may be unclear. 
Similarly, a discretionary doctrine can be clear, while a mandate 
may not be. To be sure, jurisdictional clarity tends to have attrib-
utes of rules and mandates, but it is both wider and more complex 
than the existing conversations capture. That has left jurisdictional 
clarity severely underexplored. 
Part III begins to fill that gap by unpacking jurisdictional clarity 
and laying bare the first assumption inherent in the rhetoric de-
scribed in Part I, that jurisdictional rules can be simple and clear. 
In truth, jurisdictional clarity is a byzantine complex of at least 
three interrelated intricacies. 
First, clear and simple jurisdictional lines are often extremely 
difficult to draw. The policies underlying jurisdiction and jurisdic-
tional allocation are difficult to ascertain and are often antithetical 
to each other. As a result, accommodating those competing policies 
through a clear jurisdictional rule is no easy task. In addition, nei-
ther of the institutions (Congress or the courts) that develop juris-
dictional doctrine is particularly good at it. Congress lacks the insti-
tutional expertise of dealing with jurisdiction, while the courts lack 
the institutional capacity to develop clear ex ante rules. The subop-
timality of the rulemaker leads to confusion and uncertainty in rule 
promulgation. Further, the ideal of “clear and simple” rules leads 
to the unanswered question, “Clear to whom?” Different target 
observers have different vantage points. Lay observers, because of 
their inexperience with the intricacies of jurisdiction, need more 
clarity than do lawyers and judges and respond more forcefully to 
clarity in results as opposed to clarity in abstract doctrine. Conse-
quently, even when jurisdictional doctrine is clear and simple for 
one group, it may be unclear or appear distorted to another. Fi-
nally, when clear jurisdictional lines are available and easily dis-
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cernible, difficulty arises in choosing where to establish that clear 
boundary, for that decision itself implicates a thorny set of jurisdic-
tional policies. For these reasons, the task of crafting a clear rule 
can present formidable obstacles. 
Second, jurisdictional clarity is complicated by the implementa-
tion process. Even the clearest and simplest rule has fuzziness at 
the margin, and that fuzziness often becomes magnified by judicial 
interpretation. Further, the factual application of even a clear rule 
can be exceedingly convoluted, particularly if the inquiry is de-
pendent upon facts that, as is often the case, are difficult to ascer-
tain or prove at the outset of the litigation. In short, implementa-
tion can cloud the best attempts at clarity and simplicity. 
Third, the instrumental value of jurisdictional clarity depends 
upon its particular goals, which have never been fully stated. True, 
the regular mantra is that jurisdictional clarity is important to con-
serve litigation and judicial resources and to enhance judicial le-
gitimacy. But there are different ways to structure jurisdictional 
clarity to achieve these goals. And there are unstated goals of 
streamlining inter- and intra-branch relationships that complicate 
the use of jurisdictional clarity considerably. Together, these three 
difficulties demonstrate that the ability to attain the ideal of juris-
dictional clarity and simplicity should not be presumed. 
Part IV then tackles the second assumption of the rhetoric, that 
jurisdictional clarity is an unalloyed good. Jurisdictional clarity can 
be attained, but only at a price. That price includes jurisdictional 
clarity’s unavoidable vices and the opportunity cost of reaping ju-
risdictional uncertainty’s attractive virtues. The price of jurisdic-
tional clarity may ultimately be worth it, but there are reasons to 
appreciate the limits of jurisdictional clarity and the benefits of 
more nuanced doctrine, particularly when getting the forum right 
matters significantly. 
Part V uses the previous Parts’ exploration of jurisdictional clar-
ity to advance two observations. First, it suggests an answer to the 
divergence between reality and rhetoric noted in Part I: the ideal of 
jurisdictional clarity is practically unattainable. Second, it argues 
normatively that, in any case, jurisdictional clarity ought not be 
overvalued; the inherent complexity and uncertainty in jurisdic-
tional doctrine can be harnessed to forge a better jurisdictional 
landscape through hybrid rules. 
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I conclude by asserting that, at the very least, simply repeating 
the mantra that jurisdictional rules should be simple and clear—as 
both courts and commentators often do—is unhelpful and poten-
tially misleading without a full appreciation of the complexity of 
jurisdictional clarity. 
I. THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND DOCTRINE 
Martha Field once wrote, “One of the first things we teach enter-
ing law students is the importance of clarity in rules governing 
courts’ jurisdiction.”6 Courts and commentators widely share this 
sense of the importance of jurisdictional clarity. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the doctrines themselves do not reflect it. 
A. The Rhetoric of Jurisdictional Clarity 
Because of the special nature of jurisdiction,7 the need for clarity 
in jurisdictional rules is different from the need for clarity in sub-
stantive, or even procedural, law. Jurisdiction allocates judicial au-
thority between the federal and state judicial systems, between the 
judicial system and executive agencies, among courts within a judi-
cial system, and even between an adjudicatory system and no adju-
dicatory system.8 On a practical scale, it is a component of court ac-
cess.9 Because jurisdiction circumscribes a court’s adjudicatory 
authority,10 a court that determines that it lacks subject-matter ju-
risdiction has no authority to do anything but dismiss the case.11 
 
6 Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 683, 683 (1981). 
7 I note that “jurisdiction” is a word of many meanings. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–90 (1998) (noting the importance of precision 
in applying the “jurisdictional” label). Here and throughout, I mean to refer only to 
subject-matter jurisdiction rather than personal jurisdiction. 
8 See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 
1457, 1460 (2006). 
9 See Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 821 (2009). 
10 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). For excellent expositions of juris-
diction as distinguished from merits and procedure, see Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious 
Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 Hastings L.J. 1613 (2003); Howard M. Wasserman, Juris-
diction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1547 
(2008). 
11 I note that the Court has held that a court can dismiss a case on non-jurisdictional 
grounds before it determines if it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sinochem 
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Policies underlying federal-jurisdiction doctrine primarily focus 
on societal, rather than litigant, values: protection of federal rights 
and interests, comity and federalism, allocation of judicial re-
sources and docket control, and uniformity.12 Because jurisdiction 
goes to a court’s basic authority over the case and protects underly-
ing societal values,13 defects in jurisdiction “can be raised by any 
party or the court sua sponte; may not be consented to by the par-
ties; are not subject to principles of estoppel, forfeiture, or waiver; 
and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on ap-
peal.”14 
These features of jurisdiction entail significant costs for courts 
and litigants. A jurisdictional defect raised late in the proceedings 
can undo all of the litigation time and effort the parties and court 
have spent. But the idea is that the policies underlying jurisdiction 
are too important to trust to litigants, and so the costs are accepted 
as part of the price of protecting those values. 
Jurisdictional clarity can mitigate some of the litigant costs by 
enabling litigants to file in the proper forum more often.15 A clearer 
 
Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007). For more on the im-
plications of decisional sequencing on jurisdictional issues, see Kevin M. Clermont, 
Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclu-
sion (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 77, 2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=clsops_p
apers. 
12 See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530, 
550–54 (1989). That said, and as I argue below, private values can be important to ju-
risdictional demarcations as well. In addition, the costs to individual litigants from 
harsh jurisdictional effects are private concerns that inform jurisdictional thinking. 
These private values further complicate the ideal of jurisdictional clarity. See infra 
text accompanying notes 137–48. 
13 For more detailed explorations of jurisdictionality, see Perry Dane, Jurisdictional-
ity, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (1994); Scott 
Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55, 60 (2008); Lee, 
supra note 10, at 1613–21. 
14 Dodson, supra note 13, at 56. It appears that, in the early years of American 
courts, subject-matter jurisdiction was waivable in certain instances, and courts relied 
almost exclusively on the pleadings to determine jurisdiction without holding detailed 
factual hearings. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 Va. L. 
Rev. 1829, 1836–43 (2007). 
15 See Eric Kades, The Law & Economics of Jurisdiction 4 (William & Mary Law 
Sch., Working Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431959 
(“[T]he complexity of federal jurisdiction likely results in many unintentional, errone-
ous federal court filings.”). I should note that if the parity between federal and state 
courts is high, jurisdictional uncertainty may simply cause plaintiffs to choose state 
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doctrine also should cause parties to challenge jurisdiction less of-
ten and decrease the likelihood that a jurisdictional defect will un-
ravel the litigation16 or even preclude the claim if a limitations pe-
riod has run in the interim.17 Jurisdictional uncertainty can do the 
opposite. One study, for example, reported a sixty-six percent error 
rate in invocation of federal jurisdiction under the relatively un-
clear “substantiality” component of federal “arising under” juris-
diction.18 By contrast, jurisdictional clarity generally reduces liti-
gant costs.19 
Jurisdictional clarity can also reduce judicial costs because, when 
jurisdiction is at issue, courts will be able to resolve the issue more 
easily. Because jurisdiction must be policed by the court sua sponte 
and often without diligent briefing by the parties (particularly if 
both parties wish to remain in federal court), a clear jurisdictional 
rule has great appeal to the judge. And, when the court does re-
solve a jurisdictional issue under clear doctrine, that decision is 
likely to be accurate, causing fewer appeals and fewer reversals.20 
Jurisdictional clarity also can enhance judicial legitimacy. The 
transparent judicial enforcement of a clear statutory rule of juris-
diction negates the democratically problematic perception of unau-
thorized judicial lawmaking.21 Clear jurisdictional doctrine also re-
 
court, where concurrent jurisdiction exists, to avoid the risk of an erroneous jurisdic-
tional filing. As a result, jurisdictional uncertainty may not result in substantially more 
filing errors. But, “these same convoluted rules of jurisdiction, turning as they fre-
quently do on facts known by one party and difficult to discover by their adversary, 
create opportunities to exploit this asymmetric information intentionally and obtain 
two bites at the apple.” Id. 
16 Field, supra note 6, at 683–84. 
17 Cf. Catherine T. Struve, Time and the Courts: What Deadlines and Their Treat-
ment Tell Us About the Litigation System, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 601, 629–31 (2010) 
(discussing the importance of deadlines to lawyers and litigants). 
18 See Preis, supra note 5, at 166. This study was based on circuit court determina-
tions that federal jurisdiction was improperly invoked. Id. at 159. 
19 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1891, 1906 (2004) (discussing litigant need for predictability in jurisdictional 
rules). Some of this prospective waste is overstated because parties who litigate deep 
into the merits may know enough about each other’s cases that settlement, rather 
than relitigation, becomes the most likely scenario. 
20 Conversely, uncertainty tends to foster inaccuracy. One study, for example, found 
that roughly fifty-five percent of appellate cases on the “substantiality” component of 
federal “arising under” jurisdiction were reversals. See Preis, supra note 5, at 165. 
21 Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1176 (1989) (“Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or pre-
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duces the legitimacy cost of a court erroneously exercising jurisdic-
tion when it cannot.22 Unclear jurisdictional doctrine, by contrast, 
can lead to manipulation of that doctrine for merits-based ends, 
again leading to an erosion of public confidence in the courts.23 
These are powerful arguments. It is no surprise, then, that they 
lead to the conventional wisdom about jurisdictional rules. Juris-
dictional rules should be simple and clear, the mantra goes, to al-
low jurisdiction to be determined early, easily, and cheaply, and to 
avoid the potential waste of litigant and court resources.24 Courts 
and commentators regularly invoke this easy rhetoric. 
A good expression of this mantra in jurisdictional doctrine, and 
one to which I will return throughout this Article, is the well-
pleaded complaint rule for federal statutory “arising under” juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that 
the jurisdictional basis for Section 1331 jurisdiction must appear on 
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, thus excluding 
from that statute’s jurisdictional grant federal counterclaims and 
defenses.25 The primary motivation for the rule is that whether the 
plaintiff’s complaint raises a federal question is (usually) clear, 
simple, and readily ascertainable.26 
 
cision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic—and, in the extreme, unconsti-
tutional—because they leave too much to be decided by persons other than the peo-
ple’s representatives.”). 
22 See Lee, supra note 10, at 1622 (tying jurisdiction to legitimacy). 
23 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion in Industrial America, 1870–1958, at 244–48 (1992). 
24 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity 310–16 (1950) (arguing 
that jurisdiction should be easily and readily ascertainable); Field, supra note 6, at 683 
(“One reason for jurisdictional rules to be clear and simple is that litigating at length 
over the proper forum in which to litigate is a poor use of limited judicial resources, 
expensive to the parties and to the public.”); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allo-
cation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction 
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 Va. L. Rev. 1769, 1794 (1992) (“[J]urisdictional un-
certainty can surely lead to both a waste of judicial time and added expense to the 
litigants.”). 
25 Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002) (extend-
ing the rule to federal counterclaims); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 
U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (applying the rule to federal defenses). 
26 See Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 22 (2d ed. 1993) (“The well-
pleaded complaint rule fulfills a useful and necessary function. Given the limited na-
ture of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is essential that the existence of jurisdic-
tion be determined at the outset, rather than being contingent upon what may occur 
at later stages in the litigation.”); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in 
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This rhetoric is not unique to the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
The Supreme Court and individual Justices, from Brennan to Tho-
mas, have urged jurisdictional clarity in a variety of other contexts 
using similar rhetoric.27 One example from just this past Term is 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, in which the Court considered what test to 
use to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for 
citizenship purposes under the diversity-jurisdiction statute.28 De-
termining principal place of business had proved difficult in some 
cases, and courts of appeals had crafted a number of different tests. 
Some followed the “nerve center” test, finding principal place of 
business where the corporation had its corporate headquarters. 
 
Search of Definition, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1781, 1783 (1998) (explaining that the well-
pleaded complaint rule “prevents the disruption, to both the system and the litigants, 
of shifting a case between state and federal fora in the middle of an action as federal 
issues arise or fall out”). 
27 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320–
22 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging a return to the simpler Holmes test for 
statutory “arising under” jurisdiction); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 
U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (“Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particu-
larly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful.”); 
Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 829–32 (extending the well-pleaded complaint rule to the 
exclusive patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit because a contrary rule “would 
undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded-complaint doc-
trine, which serves as a ‘quick rule of thumb’ for resolving jurisdictional conflicts” 
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 
U.S. 1, 11 (1983))); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 621 
(2002) (explaining, in adopting a bright-line waiver test for state sovereign immunity, 
that “jurisdictional rules should be clear”); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549–56 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (seeking a clear test for admiralty jurisdiction); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 
33, 50 (1990) (expressing a concern for “the stability and clarity of jurisdictional 
rules”); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 350 n.27 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[J]urisdictional rules must be clear cut and cannot turn on 
indefinite notions of ‘importance’ or ‘wide-ranging impact.’ ‘[L]itigants ought to be 
able to apply a clear test to determine whether, as an exception to the general rule of 
appellate review, they must perfect an appeal directly to the Supreme Court.’” (quot-
ing Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 877 (1984))); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 510 & n.7 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (seeking clarity for the finality 
rule in appellate jurisdiction and asserting that “[c]larity is to be desired in any stat-
ute, but in matters of jurisdiction, it is especially important. Otherwise the courts and 
the parties must expend great energy, not on the merits of dispute settlement, but on 
simply deciding whether a court has the power to hear a case” (quoting United States 
v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970))). 
28 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1190–95 (2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), which deems a 
corporation to be a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state “where it 
has its principal place of business”). 
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Others followed the “business activity” test, finding principal place 
of business where the corporation had most of its operations. Oth-
ers followed the “total activity” test, a hybrid of the two.29 
The Supreme Court in Hertz basically adopted the “nerve cen-
ter” test and held that “principal place of business” refers to the 
place where the corporation’s high-level officers “direct, control, 
and coordinate the corporation’s activities,” which in most cases 
will likely be its “nerve center,” or where its headquarters is lo-
cated.30 The Court adopted this test in large part because of its 
clear and simple application: 
[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional 
statute. Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up 
time and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their 
claims, but which court is the right court to decide those claims. 
Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage games-
manship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and set-
tlements will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits. Judicial re-
sources too are at stake. Courts have an independent obligation 
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 
when no party challenges it. So courts benefit from straightfor-
ward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of 
their power to hear a case.  
 Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater predictability 
[for both plaintiffs and defendants].31 
Thus, the rhetoric urging clarity and simplicity in jurisdictional 
rules is alive and well in both academic and judicial circles. And, 
for the reasons noted above, the rhetoric is powerful and well-
justified.  
B. The Lack of Clarity in Existing Doctrine 
It is perhaps surprising, then, that existing jurisdictional doctrine 
largely does not reflect the clarity and simplicity that the rhetoric 
 
29 Id. at 1191. 
30 Id. at 1192. 
31 Id. at 1193 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1185–86 (“[W]e place primary weight 
upon the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as sim-
ple as possible.”). 
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urges.32 A classic example is the well-pleaded complaint rule’s sister 
doctrine—the meaning of “arising under” in Section 1331. In 1916, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously incorporated the value of 
clarity into a simple and characteristically pithy test by proclaiming 
that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”33 
Yet the Supreme Court promptly departed from that formulation 
just five years later, leaving Justice Holmes in dissent.34 Instead, the 
Court adopted (some might say, returned to35) a more malleable 
standard36 that, under modern doctrine, extends federal-question 
jurisdiction to state-law claims implicating an important and sub-
stantial federal interest.37 As Justice Thomas has noted, such a 
standard for nonfederal claims “is anything but clear.”38 
Another useful example is the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. 
The traditional test for such jurisdiction asked only whether the 
tort occurred on navigable waters.39 Congress subsequently codified 
that rule in the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act.40 The 
Court nevertheless interpreted this grant to require “that the 
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity.”41 This interpretation led to the following two-part test for ad-
miralty jurisdiction: “whether the incident has ‘a potentially disrup-
tive impact on maritime commerce,’” and “whether ‘the general 
 
32 Cf. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Ju-
risdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 75, 114 (1998) (finding empirical evidence that 
federal-jurisdiction opinions have more obfuscatory linguistic devices than do sub-
stantive law opinions). 
33 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Notably, 
though, some have criticized even Justice Holmes’s formulation as unclear. See Field, 
supra note 6, at 687–88 (making this point based on “the great flexibility that exists in 
determining whether a federal cause of action exists”). 
34 Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921); id. at 214–15 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (adhering to his American Well Works formulation). 
35 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and 
Justice Holmes, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2151, 2153 (2009) (claiming that Smith-type 
claims were the norm before the early 1900s). 
36 Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (allowing federal jurisdiction over a state claim dependent 
on the construction of federal law). 
37 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 
(2005). 
38 Id. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
39 See, e.g., Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Me. 
1813) (No. 13,902). 
40 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006). 
41 Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). 
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character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘sub-
stantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’”42 As Justice 
Thomas again has noted, such a standard is “[v]ague and obscure,” 
resulting in “wasteful litigation.”43 He would return to the “simple, 
clear” locality test.44 
Other examples abound. The finality rule for appellate jurisdic-
tion,45 abstention doctrines,46 discretionary decline of supplemental 
jurisdiction,47 and standing48 all are jurisdictional doctrines notable 
for their lack of clarity and simplicity. True, a few jurisdictional 
rules could be characterized as clear or at least moving in that di-
rection.49 In the main, though, jurisdictional doctrine is riddled with 
 
42 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 
(1995) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 364–65 (1990)). In Executive Jet Avia-
tion and Grubart, the Court was interpreting the original language of the Extension of 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act; the language has since changed stylistically. Compare 
Pub. L. No. 695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 (1948) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to “all cases 
of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, 
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land”), with 
46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006) (stating that admiralty jurisdiction “includes cases of injury 
or damage, to a person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even 
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land”). 
43 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 549, 556 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
44 Id. at 550 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
45 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485–86 (1975) (articulating stan-
dards-based exceptions to the finality rule); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949) (articulating standards-based interpretations of “final”). 
For an indictment of the opacity of the current appellate-jurisdiction doctrine, see 
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1237–
39 (2007). 
46 See Field, supra note 6, at 696–98, 720 (arguing that the abstention doctrines are 
unclear). 
47 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (listing four factors courts should consider when de-
termining whether to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction). 
48 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 290 (1988) 
(stating that the requirements of standing are difficult to apply and “cannot be made 
easy”); cf. Field, supra note 6, at 709–10 (“[T]he criteria for justiciability are suffi-
ciently elastic that it is ultimately unpredictable [in certain cases involving constitu-
tional challenges to state criminal statutes].”). 
49 The well-pleaded complaint rule above is a good example. See supra text accom-
panying notes 25–26. Others have suggested that diversity jurisdiction is largely de-
fined and clear. See Field, supra note 6, at 694 (“[D]iversity jurisdiction generally is 
unlike federal question jurisdiction in that many of its basic issues are clear and easy 
to apply.”); Jonathan R. Nash, Instrument Choice in Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
Rules, Standards, and Discretion 13 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-92, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553584 (arguing that, with a few exceptions, “it is very safe 
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uncertainty and complexity.50 Indeed, virtually every jurisdictional 
doctrine contains opacity that the Court continues to defend, de-
spite its simultaneous rhetoric to the contrary. 
This gap between rhetoric and reality has a number of possible 
explanations. Stare decisis,51 a silent penchant for flexibility and 
discretion,52 a muted dissatisfaction with jurisdictional rules in cer-
tain areas,53 a genuine belief that Congress intended such uncer-
tainty,54 and more creative explanations55 are all possibilities. My 
aim is not to disprove these but rather to suggest an additional pos-
sibility: that jurisdictional clarity can be self-defeating. Despite the 
oversimplified rhetoric urging clarity and simplicity in jurisdictional 
rules, the concept itself is inherently complex, uncertain, and diffi-
cult. As a result, attaining jurisdictional clarity is practically impos-
sible, and it is no small wonder that attempts to do so have fallen 
short or been abandoned. 
 
to say that rules dominate the boundaries of federal diversity jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1332”). 
50 See Field, supra note 6, at 684 (“[T]he more one studies federal jurisdiction, the 
more forcefully one must conclude that much uncertainty surrounds the decision of 
many federal jurisdictional issues.”). 
51 Stare decisis may help explain Grable and Grubart, or at least why certain Justices 
joined in those decisions. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308, 317 (2005); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
513 U.S. 527, 554 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
52 See Field, supra note 6, at 724 (“[T]he flexibility the jurisdictional rules provide in 
their undeveloped state can prove useful to judges, allowing them to dispose of diffi-
cult cases without having directly to discuss the moral, social, or political value judg-
ments behind those dispositions.”). 
53 See Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations 
on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 Ind. L.J. 309, 342 (2007) (“Though many still 
clamor for application of the Holmes test for centrality, that test just does not 
work. . . . [It] fail[s] . . . to ensure a federal trial forum, with federal expertise, for the 
sensitive interpretation of federal law, free from state-court biases.”). 
54 Longstanding congressional silence in the face of a consistent judicial interpreta-
tion of a statute can imply a congressional intent that the statutory language continue 
to be interpreted that way. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593–
94 (2004). In addition, some statutes seem themselves to be invitations for jurisdic-
tional uncertainty. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006) (allowing courts to decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, in “exceptional circumstances,” there are 
“compelling reasons”). 
55 See Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 971, 995–96 
(2009) (arguing that jurisdictional rhetoric can be intentionally misleading, but for 
salutary purposes); Little, supra note 32, at 129–39 (suggesting several explanations 
for the high level of obfuscatory language in federal jurisdiction opinions). 
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II. DISSOCIATING CLARITY 
Explaining why clarity can be so complex and unclear begins 
with explaining why the existing discourse does not capture the 
concept. Two major conversations are relevant to jurisdictional 
clarity: rules versus standards and mandate versus discretion. 
These are useful to the issues of jurisdictional clarity, but jurisdic-
tional clarity is both broader and more complex. Clarity, in other 
words, is its own conversation. 
A. Rules and Standards 
The debate between rules and standards has a rich pedigree.56 
Although commentators have struggled to define and separate 
rules and standards with precision,57 at a basic level, there are large 
areas of agreement. A rule is a norm that is enforced according to 
its terms rather than the policies animating it.58 A standard, by con-
 
56 For a very small sampling of the rich literature exploring rules and standards gen-
erally, see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of 
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Scalia, su-
pra note 21; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 
123 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (2010); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. 
Rev. 953 (1995). For recent attempts to adapt that debate to jurisdictional doctrine, 
see Freer, supra note 53; Preis, supra note 5, at 167–92; Nash, supra note 49.  
57 See Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 823, 828–32 (1991) (stating that rules and standards themselves lack pre-
cise definition or categorization); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on Legal Doc-
trine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law 10–11 (June 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/Rules%20vs%20Standards.pdf) (asserting 
that academic attempts to distinguish between rules and standards are inherently dif-
ficult). Often, the terms are conceptualized not as binary but rather as nodes on a con-
tinuum, existing with other nodes as well. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 56, at 963–64 
(including “factors”); Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and Principles, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_3.html (Mar. 
7, 2004) (including “principles”).  
58 Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein’s 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 531, 541 (1997). In this 
Part, I use the term “rule” in the narrow sense of the term as it is used in the rules 
versus standards conversation. Elsewhere, though, I use it in the generic sense that 
legal “rules” generally encompass all kinds of norm codification, including tests based 
upon standards. 
DODSON_PRE_PP 2/23/2011  8:47 PM 
16 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
trast, is the attempt to enforce those policies more directly.59 Thus, 
“Speed Limit 65” is a rule; “drive at a safe speed” is a standard.60 
Rules and standards have different effects. Rules restrict the dis-
cretion of the decisionmaker to determining if a predetermined set 
of facts exists.61 By contrast, standards are more inclusive about the 
particular facts the decisionmaker can consider based on the indi-
vidualized circumstances of the case.62 To illustrate, “Speed Limit 
65” specifies the facts to be considered, while “drive at a safe 
speed” is relatively open-ended and allows for considerable flexi-
bility in application. As a normative matter, the more one trusts 
lower courts’ ability to accurately assess and enforce jurisdictional 
policies, the more one should favor standards.63 By contrast, those 
who favor rules tend to be pessimistic about judicial discretion.64 
These differences lead to a fairly well-accepted set of pros and 
cons for rules and standards. Because rules set a predetermined 
condition that allows for little discretion, they generally provide 
better ex ante certainty, predictability, and fairness across cases, 
leading generally to fewer cases of primary actor failure.65 They 
also often are easier for courts to apply.66 
 
59 See Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58. 
60 See Alexander, supra note 58, at 541–42. 
61 Freer, supra note 53, at 311 (“A rule affords the decisionmaker no discretion, but 
cabins its inquiry to whether a given set of facts exists. A standard, in contrast, affords 
the decisionmaker greater discretion by prescribing a series of relevant factors to be 
weighed in view of a policy goal.”); Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58 (explaining that a 
rule “binds a decisionmaker” to a particular outcome if certain delimited facts are es-
tablished). 
62 See Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58–59 (asserting that a standard allows for consid-
eration of all facts); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 965 (explaining that the application of 
a standard can only be done post hoc). 
63 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 398 (2005). 
64 Alexander, supra note 58, at 543. The normative positions are generally regarded 
as “formalist” (those who urge judges to decide cases based on rules) and “instrumen-
talist” (those who urge judges to decide cases based on standards). See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 530, 531 (1999). 
65 See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 36–39 (2000). But see Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1220–21 
(suggesting that, at least in some contexts, standards can reduce primary actor failure 
by forcing primary actors to think more carefully about their conduct). 
66 See Schauer, supra note 56, at 229–30; Alexander, supra note 58, at 542–43; Kap-
low, supra note 56, at 571, 581. 
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But standards have their advantages. Standards usually are more 
closely aligned with their underlying norms because standards in-
corporate those norms directly.67 Rules, by contrast, suffer from 
both overinclusion and underinclusion because they capture the 
underlying policies inaccurately.68 In addition, standards are easier 
and cheaper to develop ex ante.69 Standards also are likely to be 
fairer as applied to any given case and are more adaptable to 
changing circumstances that might make a rule obsolete.70 Stan-
dards generally are less susceptible to manipulation by litigants.71 
Finally, standards regulating primary conduct can induce salutary 
“moral deliberation” within primary actors.72 At first blush, one 
might think that the debate between rules and standards fully cap-
tures the issues of jurisdictional clarity. Rules, after all, seem to be 
the paradigm of clarity and simplicity because of their better pre-
dictability and ease of application. 
But that is not necessarily the case. Rules may be neither clear 
nor simple, and standards can be both. Recall that a rule mandates 
an outcome based on predetermined facts; a norm can fit that de-
scription while also being both uncertain and complex. Indeed, as 
Peter Schuck has demonstrated, rules can be extremely complex 
due to the cumulative effect of “density, technicality, differentia-
tion, and indeterminacy.”73 This often occurs when the desire to 
maximize accuracy in rules leads to conditions and exceptions 
(even if those conditions and exceptions are themselves rules).74 
Sticking with the driving example, a complex rule might be: 
Speed Limit 65, except (a) if you are driving a truck after sun-
down, Speed Limit 55; (b) if you are a police officer in pursuit of 
a suspect, Speed Limit 85, but you must have sirens and lights on; 
(c) drive five miles per hour slower for each inch per hour of 
 
67 Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58–59. 
68 Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 56, at 957, 992–93. 
69 Kaplow, supra note 56, at 591. 
70 See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992–96. 
71 Id. at 995. The well-pleaded complaint rule, for example, can lead to artful plead-
ing attempts by plaintiffs, a form of jurisdictional manipulation to avoid removal. 
Miller, supra note 26, at 1783. 
72 Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1217. 
73 Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 
Duke L.J. 1, 3 (1992). 
74 See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 962. 
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rainfall; (d) drive five miles per hour slower for each inch of ac-
cumulated snow; (e) yield for all official emergency vehicles; (f) 
do not drive at all if your blood alcohol level is 0.08% or higher, 
and so on.  
The tax code is an easy real-world example,75 and diversity juris-
diction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), with its 
numerous requirements and exceptions, is a good jurisdictional ex-
ample.76 In short, if accuracy is a concern, then the more rule-like 
the rule, the more complex it will have to be. 
Rules also can be unclear. To take the driving example from the 
preceding paragraph, it might be extremely difficult for a driver, 
enforcing officer, and criminal jury to determine what the inch-per-
hour rainfall was at a particular time and place. A good jurisdic-
tional illustration is the requirement for diversity jurisdiction that 
the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.77 Courts have struggled 
to determine how non-monetary relief is valued in that threshold 
amount,78 and it often cannot be predicted clearly whether a suit 
seeking primarily injunctive relief will satisfy this rule. Another ju-
risdictional example is the CAFA requirement that a district court 
decline jurisdiction if greater than two-thirds of the proposed class 
members are citizens of the state in which the action was originally 
filed,79 a calculation that could be extremely difficult if the class 
members are numerous and largely unknown. In other words, as 
the facts prescribed by the rule become numerous or difficult to as-
certain or apply, the rule becomes less clear.80 
By contrast, the standard “drive at a safe speed” could be far 
clearer, particularly if all actors have similar baseline assumptions 
about what that standard means for the situation at hand and if the 
 
75 Schuck, supra note 73, at 5–6. 
76 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). One court described CAFA as an “opaque, baroque 
maze of interlocking cross-references.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 
(11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part by Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, 608 F.3d 744, 747 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
77 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
78 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3 (5th ed. 2007). 
79 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006). 
80 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-
making, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 261 (1974) (arguing that clarity and determinacy can be 
gauged from the number and simplicity of the facts to which legal consequences at-
tach). 
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facts necessary to prove those assumptions are readily ascertain-
able. We all know, for instance, that driving 100 miles per hour in 
slick conditions at night on a curvy road is not “safe.” As Justice 
Scalia has admitted, even the famous “reasonableness” standard 
from torts can, at the margins, become an issue of law that is just as 
clear as any rule purports to be.81 For the same reasons, at least one 
commentator has argued that the standard for statutory “arising 
under” jurisdiction as elaborated in Grable & Sons Metal Products 
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing82 is relatively clear and pre-
dictable to apply.83 
Things are complicated further by the interpretive process, 
which tends to move both rules and standards to a middle ground. 
As Pierre Schlag has argued, rules tend to become less clear as 
courts generate exceptions, define terms with resort to underlying 
policies, and give case-specific explanations.84 “[N]o law” in the 
First Amendment85 does not actually mean “no law” but instead 
means a standard of policies that must be balanced.86 Similarly, 
standards tend to become clearer as limits are established by spe-
cific application and as clearer summaries are substituted for com-
plex or uncertain elements.87 Negligence per se is a good example 
of the clarifying effect of the “reasonableness” standard in particu-
lar application. For jurisdictional illustrations, the appellate-
 
81 Scalia, supra note 21, at 1181. For a classic statement of this principle, see Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 113 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 
2009) (1881) (“A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a 
fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the commu-
nity in ordinary instances far better than an average jury.”). 
82 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005). 
83 Freer, supra note 53, at 343 (“Grable does not countenance an indeterminate ad 
hoc jurisprudence. Rather, it seems likely that cases will fall into rather discernible 
categories. . . . Rather than throwing the centrality assessment into chaos, the stan-
dard set forth in Grable seems workable and appropriate.”). 
84 Schlag, supra note 56, at 429. 
85 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
86 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 521 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]here 
are those who find in the Constitution a wholly unfettered right of expression. . . . The 
historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was 
to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the 
range of political interest.”). 
87 Schlag, supra note 56, at 429. 
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jurisdiction rules requiring a “final” judgment or decision88 have 
been interpreted to have several uncertain exceptions and applica-
tions,89 while the statutory “arising under” standard for federal-
question jurisdiction has been interpreted to be covered by the 
clearer well-pleaded complaint rule.90 
As I explain in Part III, things get far more complicated than 
even this in matters of federal jurisdiction. Suffice it to say for now 
that clarity is different than rulism. Rules do generally tend to be 
clearer and simpler than standards, but that is not always the case. 
As a result, although the rules versus standards debate is informa-
tive, jurisdictional clarity must be unpacked on its own terms. 
B. Mandates and Discretion 
Before getting to that, though, there is another debate that must 
be discussed: mandates versus discretion. It is important not only 
because it touches upon issues of clarity but also because it has 
moved full-tilt to the area of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The mandate versus discretion dichotomy has two different ap-
plications. The first is in the facts. How much discretion does a 
judge have to consider and weigh available facts? This application 
merges with the rules versus standards dichotomy discussed 
above,91 and, as I demonstrated there, jurisdictional clarity is dis-
tinct from it. 
The second application is in the law, where the debate has dis-
tinguished itself from the rules versus standards debate and has 
moved prominently into the arena of federal jurisdiction. The 
questions are these: Does or should a federal court have discretion 
(and, if so, how much) to determine the boundaries of its jurisdic-
tion, and whether to decline to exercise it? Some cases are easier 
than others. For example, Congress expressly gave federal courts 
 
88 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
89 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485–86 (1975) (listing exceptions); 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949) (characterizing cer-
tain interlocutory orders as “final”); see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Dis-
cretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 565–66 (1985) (“The word ‘final’ has an authoritative 
and crisp ring to it, but questions arise in its application. . . . [E]ven words that appear 
sharp turn out, on close examination, to be fuzzy around the edges.”). 
90 For a detailed discussion of the history of the Court’s interpretation of the statu-
tory language, see Freer, supra note 53, at 311–17. 
91 See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
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discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if com-
pelling reasons exist.92 Similarly, Congress expressly gave federal 
courts discretion to decline to exercise CAFA diversity jurisdiction 
over certain class actions in the interest of justice and under the to-
tality of the circumstances.93 But there is a vigorous and ongoing 
debate about the propriety of judicial discretion in matters of fed-
eral jurisdiction when Congress has not been so explicit. 
That debate prominently features the respective work of Martin 
Redish and David Shapiro.94 Redish, on the one hand, has argued 
that judicially created abstention doctrines and judicially created 
exceptions to congressional grants of jurisdiction constitute ille-
gitimate judicial lawmaking and make for bad policy.95 Shapiro, on 
 
92 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006). 
93 Id. § 1332(d)(3) (2006). 
94 By highlighting Redish and Shapiro, I do not mean to suggest that this is an exclu-
sive dialogue; other prominent voices have made important contributions to the con-
versation. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1207, 1256–74 (2001) (exploring the historical legitimacy of judicial discretion to 
shape jurisdiction); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, 
Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 48–49 (1990) (arguing that 
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction and the authority to define it evolve through a 
dialogue between Congress and the courts); Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1892–95 (gen-
erally agreeing with Shapiro but charting a more middle-of-the-road approach); Gene 
R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics—A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdic-
tional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 767, 788–89 (arguing that courts can help 
shape jurisdictional contours for judicial administration reasons); Nash, supra note 49, 
at 46 (arguing that jurisdictional grants should be rule-based and unsusceptible to dis-
cretion and that abstention doctrines should be discretionary based on standards). I 
hasten to add that the debate widens as the constitutional limits on congressional con-
trol of jurisdiction are considered. For a sampling of that related discussion, compare, 
for example, Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to 
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 143, 
145 (1982) (arguing that Congress has extremely broad power to control the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts), and William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte 
McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 260 (1973) (same), with, for example, Akhil Reed 
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Ju-
risdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 243 (1985) (arguing that federal courts have some ju-
risdiction that cannot be removed by Congress), and Tara Leigh Grove, The Struc-
tural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) 
(arguing that bicameralism and presentment requirements limit Congress’s power). 
95 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of 
the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 105–14 (1984) (arguing for little to no judicial 
authority over jurisdictional doctrine). To be clear, Redish’s work challenges federal-
court discretion to decline jurisdiction despite a lack of congressional authorization to 
do so. He does not challenge (at least not on institutional lawlessness grounds) fed-
eral-court discretion to decline jurisdiction when authorized by Congress. 
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the other hand, has argued that federal courts should exercise dis-
cretion both to define jurisdictional boundaries and to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction that is admittedly conferred.96 He argues that 
such judicial discretion is “desirable in giving room for flexibility, 
fine-tuning, recognition of difference, and accommodation of un-
foreseen developments,”97 and that courts are better at drawing ac-
curate jurisdictional lines than Congress.98 He also suggests that ju-
dicial discretion is legitimate because the statutory language that 
Congress uses to draw jurisdictional boundaries is often (and is in-
tended to be) discretion conferring.99 
The mandate versus discretion debate is relevant to jurisdic-
tional clarity because both implicate questions of judicial legiti-
macy, lawful authority, hierarchical order, institutional capacity, 
and inter-branch conversations. In addition, it seems to be true that 
broad judicial discretion tends to lead to complex and unclear doc-
trine.100 But these implications are mainly orthogonal to jurisdic-
tional clarity. The mandate versus discretion debate is directed 
primarily at the singular institutional question of which branch 
(Congress or the courts) is lawfully authorized or normatively su-
perior for drawing jurisdictional boundaries. That question is quite 
different from—though not entirely unrelated to—the question 
whether those boundaries are clear and simple. 
That difference is emphasized by the fact that a discretionary 
doctrine may be clear,101 while a mandate may not. The congres-
sional authorization for courts to exercise discretion to retain or 
decline supplemental jurisdiction, for example, is guided by some 
relatively clear factors, including when the state claim substantially 
predominates over the original-jurisdiction claims and when the 
 
96 Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574–79; see also David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the 
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to “Reas-
sessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 Va. 
L. Rev. 1839, 1844–46 (1992) (amplifying the argument). 
97 Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841. 
98 Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574. 
99 David L. Shapiro, Foreword: A Cave Drawing for the Ages, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 
1834, 1843 (1999). 
100 Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1904; Schuck, supra note 73, at 10–11. 
101 Indeed, those who argue in favor of discretion and standards tend to argue that 
the vaguest and most complicated balancing test will tend to become clear over time 
by the simple process of precedent-building. See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 546–47, 
589; see also Kaplow, supra note 56, at 577–79 (acknowledging the argument). 
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district court has dismissed all of the original-jurisdiction claims.102 
By contrast, Article III standing is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-
requisite, but its requirements are uncertain in application and un-
predictable in result.103 Similarly, the Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and 
Younger v. Harris abstention doctrines are mandatory,104 but they 
have been maligned as unclear and uncertain.105 In short, whether a 
jurisdictional norm is mandatory or discretionary is separate from 
whether it is clear and simple. 
III. COMPLEXITIES OF CLARITY 
Because neither the rules versus standards nor the mandate ver-
sus discretion discourse captures it, jurisdictional clarity needs its 
own conversation. To date, however, such a separate discourse has 
consisted entirely of the thoughtless mantra that jurisdictional rules 
should be clear and simple. As a result, jurisdictional clarity is se-
verely underexplored. 
This Part takes up that challenge by tackling several complicat-
ing facets of jurisdictional clarity: design difficulties, obscurities of 
interpretation and application, and the multi-functionality of clar-
ity. Each of these, I argue, adds layers of uncertainty and intricacy 
to the otherwise naïve ideal that jurisdictional rules can be clear 
and simple. 
A. Design Difficulties 
Cass Sunstein has stated, “The first problem with rules is that it 
can be very hard to design good ones.”106 The same is true for de-
signing clear jurisdictional doctrine. There are at least four reasons. 
First, competing policies underlying jurisdiction make clear con-
tours problematic. Second, suboptimal institutional capacities 
 
102 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006). 
103 See Field, supra note 6, at 709–10; Fletcher, supra note 48, at 221 & n.4 (arguing 
that standing doctrine is incoherent because the requirements are difficult to apply). 
104 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 
(1989) (stating that federal courts “must” abstain under the circumstances identified 
in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and its progeny); Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).  
105 Field, supra note 6, at 696 n.60, 720. But see Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1902–03 
(expressing more sympathy for Younger). 
106 Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992. 
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hamper the promulgation of clear jurisdictional rules. Third, dispa-
rate perceptions of target actors—those observing the effects of the 
jurisdictional rules—create tensions that are difficult to resolve. 
Fourth, even when clear jurisdictional rules are possible, the choice 
between viable options can be uncertain and difficult. Each design 
difficulty clouds the ideal of a clear and simple jurisdictional doc-
trine. 
1. Competing Jurisdictional Policies 
An inescapable feature of jurisdictional clarity is the complex 
character of subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction 
comes in many shapes and sizes, including standing, various types 
of original jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction. Within the vari-
ous types of original jurisdiction are federal “arising under” juris-
diction, diversity jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, supplemental 
jurisdiction, admiralty jurisdiction, bankruptcy jurisdiction, and in-
dividual jurisdiction-conferring statutes. There are constitutional 
and statutory grants. There are constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law limits, such as immunity, abstention, deadlines, and pre-
conditions. 
These myriad forms of jurisdiction are tied to the differing—and 
sometimes conflicting—goals that jurisdiction promotes. Jurisdic-
tional lines usually are based upon the need for the protection of 
federal rights and interests, comity and federalism, judicial re-
sources and docket control, and uniformity.107 Thus, for example, 
diversity jurisdiction is largely viewed as necessary to provide a 
neutral federal forum to adjudicate interstate conflicts.108 Federal-
 
107 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 550–54. 
108 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); cf. 
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 
496–97 (1928) (arguing that a principal basis was to “protect creditors against legisla-
tion favorable to debtors”); Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The 
Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 997, 1049–
52 (2007) (recounting the belief of some Framers that diversity jurisdiction would 
check the “unrestrained majoritarianism” of state juries). Modern justifications in-
clude preventing bias against out-of-state litigants, the desire to have federal courts 
contribute to the development of state law, the desire to alleviate overburdening state 
court dockets, and the availability of a forum that is perceived to be of a higher qual-
ity for the dispensation of justice. Redish, supra note 24, at 1800. But see Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for 
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question jurisdiction is needed to commit important federal rights 
and interests to the experience and solicitude of the federal 
courts.109 Standing and supplemental jurisdiction promote litigation 
efficiency. At the same time, limitations and discretionary declina-
tions of jurisdiction often protect state interests and scarce federal 
judicial resources. Jurisdiction also helps demarcate boundaries of 
institutional authority among law-speaking organs: Original, appel-
late, and removal jurisdiction separate federal-court authority from 
state-court authority; federal appellate jurisdiction separates trial-
court authority from appellate-court authority; and justiciability 
and statutory limits separate judicial authority from political or 
agency authority.110 
These divergent policies and goals are difficult to unite under 
one overarching, clear jurisdictional rule because they are often in 
tension with each other. As an easy example, the tension between 
separation-of-powers and federalism values often plays out in ju-
risdictional doctrine. A clear jurisdictional grant might make it eas-
ier for a court to adhere to the will of Congress and thus promote 
separation-of-powers values.111 But it might also tread on the pre-
rogative of states if the congressional grant is overbroad. The 
courts have long exercised authority to decline jurisdiction in those 
contexts out of concern for federalism.112 But this practice then runs 
up against the criticism that such declination is unlawful, violates 
separation of powers, and creates too much discretion.113 
Things get much more complicated when the other jurisdictional 
values get added into the mix. Consider federal “arising under” ju-
 
Further Reforms, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 969–84 (1979) (pointing out significant bene-
fits from abolishing general state-citizen diversity jurisdiction). 
109 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 
(2005). 
110 Lees, supra note 8, at 1478–86. 
111 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a 
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (“Vague and obscure rules may permit judicial power to reach beyond its con-
stitutional and statutory limits . . . .”). 
112 See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 547. 
113 See Field, supra note 6, at 718–19; Redish, supra note 24, at 1831. For a novel ar-
gument for the concurrent sharing of jurisdiction in such cases, see Barry Friedman, 
Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211 (2004). 
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risdiction, for example. The Holmes test—that the case arises un-
der the law that creates the cause of action—is a relatively clear ju-
risdictional test that captures the basic policy of ensuring that fed-
eral district courts can hear federal claims out of concerns for 
accuracy and uniformity.114 But some state causes of action none-
theless raise important federal issues that, for the same reasons, 
ought to be heard by federal courts.115 These limitations of the 
Holmes test for original, district-court federal-question jurisdiction 
lead to a broader and relatively less clear rule for the Supreme 
Court’s federal-question appellate jurisdiction.116 And, to control its 
own docket, the Supreme Court has interpreted original, district-
court federal-question jurisdiction to be broader than the Holmes 
test, creating more uncertainty at those edges.117 
Conversely, because the Holmes test is overinclusive and in-
trudes upon the very federalism values that animate federal juris-
diction, abstention doctrines on the back end allow an escape hatch 
for certain cases. But, because they take the form of policy-laden 
exceptions to an imperfect rule, they are themselves generally un-
clear and complicated inquiries,118 and, because the courts imple-
ment them without express authorization from Congress, they are 
often criticized as unlawful exercises of judicial lawmaking.  
The point is that an attempt to design a relatively clear jurisdic-
tional line in one area for one policy value often leads to such inac-
curacies and disconnects with competing policies that correction 
quickly follows in the form of express exceptions or fact-specific 
application. 
 
114 See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (asserting that most federal questions arise from fed-
eral causes of action). 
115 See Freer, supra note 53, at 342 (arguing that the Holmes test fails “to ensure a 
federal trial forum, with federal expertise, for the sensitive interpretation of federal 
law, free from state-court biases”); Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1667, 1677–82 (2008) (recasting § 1331 
jurisdiction as dependent upon either a federal cause of action or a federal right). 
116 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975) (creating exceptions 
to the finality rule for appellate jurisdiction to broaden opportunities for federal is-
sues to be heard in federal court). 
117 Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a 
federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonethe-
less turn on substantial questions of federal law . . . .”). 
118 See, e.g., Field, supra note 6, at 720 (maligning Younger abstention for these rea-
sons). 
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2. Institutional Incapacities 
In addition to the problem of accommodating the competing ju-
risdictional policies, the identity of the institution making the rule 
has its own troubles for jurisdictional clarity. There are basically 
three types of institutional rulemakers: Congress, the courts, or 
both in collaboration. As it turns out, each type presents its own 
challenges for jurisdictional clarity.119 
Congress has a difficult time crafting clear jurisdictional rules for 
two basic reasons: a lack of expertise in jurisdictional issues (at 
least as compared to the courts) and a lack of political motivation. 
Indeed, Congress has largely eschewed attempts to promulgate 
clear jurisdictional statutes, instead preferring more flexible lan-
guage to allow courts to play a role.120 There are pockets of clarity 
and specificity, of course,121 but the proportion of major jurisdic-
tional statutes that uses uncertain language and the limited role 
that Congress plays once courts have begun interpreting that lan-
guage122 suggest that Congress, though it has the time and resources 
to best attempt to create clear jurisdictional boundaries ex ante, is 
uncomfortable and perhaps unmotivated to do so. 
Courts also have difficulty, for although they have the expertise, 
they lack the time, resources, and institutional structure to craft 
clear, ex ante boundaries.123 The Rules Enabling Act does provide 
the Supreme Court, through its appointed committees, with that 
ability, but most rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act cannot 
be jurisdictional because the Act delegates rulemaking authority 
only over matters relating to “practice and procedure.”124 In the 
 
119 I do not take a normative position on which institution should draw jurisdictional 
lines, which has been debated at length elsewhere. See supra text accompanying notes 
94–99. I explore those roles only from the perspective of their impact on jurisdictional 
clarity. 
120 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (using the term “arising under”); id. § 1367(a) 
(using the term “so related”). 
121 See, e.g., id. § 1332(a) (setting a dollar amount-in-controversy limit). 
122 For example, by leaving the language of § 1331 unchanged for over 100 years, 
Congress has acquiesced in virtually all of the interpretive gloss the Court has placed 
on it. See Friedman, supra note 94, at 24 (stating that although “Congress’s intent has 
had little . . . to do with” judicial interpretation of § 1331, “Congress generally has let 
the Court have its way without interference”). 
123 See Scalia, supra note 21, at 1182–83 (explaining these difficulties for courts). 
124 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules govern 
“procedure”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (asserting that “[t]hese rules do not extend or limit 
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main, then, judicial line-drawing must be done ex post, in the con-
text of a particular case, in the incremental common law fashion of 
building upon doctrine.125 That can be a very poor way to develop 
jurisdictional doctrine clearly because it often takes a long time to 
develop clear and generally applicable tests. It also causes path de-
pendence from stare decisis—it is hard for courts to correct them-
selves once a jurisdictional line has been drawn, resulting in doc-
trinal accommodations that are complicated, confusing, and 
unclear.126 And courts usually offer reasons for their rules (while 
Congress does not),127 inviting uncertainty in specific circumstances 
where a clear rule does not fit the articulated policies. Finally, 
courts have a weaker claim to constitutional authority in develop-
ing jurisdictional boundaries since the Constitution generally 
commits to Congress the power to control court jurisdiction.128 As a 
result, courts may be wary of drawing clear jurisdictional lines for 
fear that such bold strokes will infringe upon Congress’s authority. 
Barry Friedman has argued that jurisdictional boundaries are 
created by both branches through a dialogic process.129 Assuming 
Congress and the courts do not have fundamental disagreements 
 
the jurisdiction of the district courts”). There is an exception allowing rules to define 
what is “final” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) 
(2006). The Supreme Court has made clear that it prefers the formal rulemaking 
process to the development of rules in the context of a particular case. See Mohawk 
Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009). 
125 See Redish, supra note 24, at 1769 (arguing that most modern jurisdictional doc-
trines have evolved incrementally rather than being promulgated in detail all at once). 
126 Stare decisis arguably has less force in matters of federal jurisdiction as opposed 
to matters involving primary actors. See id. at 1770 n.6 (“Stare decisis may be espe-
cially important when legal issues directly affect the planning of primary social or 
economic behavior.”). But lax stare decisis in jurisdictional doctrine creates more un-
certainty and instability because of the greater likelihood of an abrupt change of di-
rection. 
127 There are exceptions. As Fred Schauer has noted, courts decide some cases with-
out giving reasons, such as jury verdicts, trial-judge rulings on objections, and the de-
nial of certiorari. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 637 (1995). 
These are unlikely to come up often in the jurisdictional context. In addition, Con-
gress occasionally codifies its reasons in bills. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
128 See U.S. Const. art III, § 1. 
129 Friedman, supra note 94, at 48–49. 
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about how to draw the jurisdictional lines,130 such a process seems 
to have the best of both worlds: Congress’s capacity for ex ante 
rules coupled with the judiciary’s experience with jurisdiction. In 
practice, though, the dialogue often is quite limited and, as a result, 
does not appear to improve jurisdictional clarity. As discussed 
above, Congress usually promulgates jurisdictional statutes with 
open-ended terms and lets the courts interpret them as they see 
fit.131 Such a process is less a dialogue than a delegation. Similarly, 
when the courts take the lead, Congress often responds merely by 
codifying existing doctrine rather than improving jurisdictional 
clarity.132 As much could be said about the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute, which few have argued is clearer or simpler 
than the pre-existing doctrine.133 The use of clear statement rules in 
jurisdictional doctrine has generated some promising results, but 
that has its own complications, which I discuss in more detail be-
low.134 In sum, each institution’s inadequacies make clear rulemak-
ing complicated. 
 
130 This assumption is not universally shared. See, e.g., id. at 27–28 (arguing that the 
courts have long tried to narrow diversity jurisdiction, while Congress has repeatedly 
chosen to retain it). 
131 See text accompanying supra notes 120–22. A rare counterexample is the recent 
back-and-forth between the Court and Congress over the scope of habeas corpus for 
executive detainees. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733–36 (2008). 
132 There are a few counter examples. The courts haphazardly defined corporate citi-
zenship for diversity-jurisdiction purposes until Congress stepped in to define it more 
clearly. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006) (defining corporate citizenship); Field, supra 
note 6, at 694 (discussing the doctrinal development). 
133 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (calling the statute “opaque”); Redish, supra note 24, at 1822 (arguing that 
the “so related” test “is plagued by a good deal of circularity and question-begging”); 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemen-
tal Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, 961 (1991) (defend-
ing the statute but conceding that “codifying a complex area like supplemental juris-
diction . . . is itself complex business” and that “[t]he statute is concededly not 
perfect”); Symposium, A Reappraisal of the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: Title 
28 U.S.C. § 1367, 74 Ind. L.J. 1 (1998) (exploring doctrinal and practical intricacies of 
the supplemental-jurisdiction statute). But see Nash, supra note 49, at 24–25 (arguing 
that supplemental jurisdiction is fairly clear). 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 164–80. 
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3. Disparate Perceptions of Target Actors 
The design difficulty is further clouded by the rarely acknowl-
edged question inherent in the mantra favoring “clear and simple” 
jurisdictional rules: “Clear and simple to whom?”  
One might answer that question by asserting that jurisdictional 
clarity should be targeted to lawyers and judges. Federal jurisdic-
tion, after all, is seen as “law for lawyers” because it concerns the 
intricate navigation of the federal-court system as opposed to the 
regulation of primary lay conduct.135 This makes some sense: the 
cost savings and legitimacy enhancements produced by jurisdic-
tional clarity primarily benefit litigants (through the exercised 
judgment of their lawyers) and judges.136 But there is another im-
portant observer, and that is the lay public. Commentators usually 
marginalize the effect of jurisdictional clarity on the lay observer,137 
but I believe the effect creates three significant but overlooked di-
vides that complicate the development of clear and simple jurisdic-
tional doctrine. 
The first is one of motivation. Although secondary legal actors 
do benefit from clear jurisdictional doctrine, they also may have 
powerful incentives to undermine that clarity. Lawyers, for exam-
ple, might favor complicated doctrine to ensure a continued need 
for representation and might also favor uncertain doctrine to allow 
for maximum flexibility in argument for a preferred forum.138 
Judges may resist clarifying developments to allow for greater ex-
ercise of judicial power, to be able to write scholarly opinions, to 
clear dockets through nimble use of a flexible jurisdictional doc-
 
135 Little, supra note 32, at 76. 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 15–24. 
137 See, e.g., Little, supra note 32, at 78. There are some exceptions for jurisdictional 
doctrines, such as patent or admiralty jurisdiction, that have an impact on a special-
ized group of lay primary actors. See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 553 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such a test 
also introduces undesirable uncertainty into the affairs of private actors—even those 
involved in common maritime activities—who cannot predict whether or not their 
conduct may justify the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.”). In addition, jurisdictional 
statutes can be packaged in a way that is more appealing to laity, such as the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–14 (2005) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which was pitched by some as tort reform. See, e.g., 
151 Cong. Rec. S1234–35, 1241–42 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statements of Sens. Ses-
sions and Voinovich). 
138 See Schuck, supra note 73, at 26, 32. 
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trine, or to promote more subtle substantive agendas in disguise.139 
I do not mean to imply that these incentives will carry the day; I 
just mean to characterize as an oversimplification the idea that the 
legal community has a strong and uniform incentive to clarify ju-
risdictional doctrine. The lay public, by contrast, has a far less com-
plicated incentive structure. 
The second divide is in the degree of clarity needed. Lawyers 
and judges, because of their expertise and experience in law and 
jurisdiction, can understand doctrine at a level of complexity and 
uncertainty that lay persons cannot. A lay person may read the “so 
related” language of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute140 and 
have no understanding at all of its meaning, while a seasoned law-
yer can identify, with relative precision, what claims will meet that 
standard and what claims will not. In other words, what is clear to 
one observer may be unclear to another, and both observers are 
important in the context of doctrinal clarity. 
The third divide is one in kind. For the lawyers and judges—and 
for legal academics and legislators, too—conceptual clarity is im-
portant to make sense of the doctrine and to tie it to broader 
themes and consistencies throughout the law. It is particularly im-
portant in jurisdictional contexts, which are designed to promote 
systemic non-litigant values. It makes sense to them to wrangle 
over the clarity of supplemental jurisdiction or abstention doctrines 
and whether the level of clarity in those doctrines is consistent with 
notions of judicial power or federalism values. But to the extent 
these individuals advocate for clear and simple jurisdictional doc-
trine for those reasons, they likely promote doctrinal clarity in the 
abstract. 
But there is another form of doctrinal clarity, one that focuses on 
results visible to lay observers: the operational clarity of the doc-
trine. As Justice Scalia has noted, “When a case is accorded a dif-
ferent disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system 
of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be differ-
ent, but that it be seen to be so.”141 In other words, it is not enough 
 
139 See id. at 26, 33–34 (discussing these incentives in the context of substantive law). 
140 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
141 Scalia, supra note 21, at 1178. On a related note, Justice Scalia has stated that it is 
“[m]uch better, even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any gener-
alization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to 
DODSON_PRE_PP 2/23/2011  8:47 PM 
32 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
that jurisdictional doctrine be clear; it also must clearly explain the 
differences in results to interested lay observers. Lay observers 
could not care less that the test for federal-question jurisdiction, in 
the abstract, might “resemble[] more the free-standing, subjective, 
and individualized determinations of Judge Wapner than a coher-
ent, generalizable jurisdictional doctrine.”142 They care about con-
sistent, fair, and sensible results (and perhaps even think that 
Judge Wapner does a fair job of achieving that!). To be sure, clear 
doctrine might lead to clear results much of the time. But that is 
not always the case, and the Court has had occasion to choose be-
tween an abstract doctrinal clarity that might make sense to law-
yers and judges and an operational clarity in results that would 
make better sense to lay observers. 
For example, in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., the Court 
held that a merits determination began running the time to appeal 
even though a motion for attorney’s fees was still pending, and 
even though the law authorizing attorney’s fees treated them as 
part of the merits judgment.143 The Court explained: 
This practical approach to the matter suggests that what is of im-
portance here is not preservation of conceptual consistency in 
the status of a particular fee authorization as “merits” or “non-
merits,” but rather preservation of operational consistency and 
predictability in the overall application of § 1291. This requires, 
we think, a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s 
fees for the litigation in question does not prevent judgment on 
the merits from being final.144 
Budinich thus favors predictability in results (what the Court 
termed “operational consistency and predictability”) over doctrinal 
predictability (what the Court termed “conceptual consistency”).145 
 
in explanation of the decision.” Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint 
and Public Reason: What is “The Work We Expect of Law”?, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 963, 
966 (2002) (arguing that decisionmakers should have several goals in mind: to resolve 
disputes, to establish predictable and stable legal doctrine, and to promote morally 
appropriate and justified outcomes). 
142 Redish, supra note 24, at 1794. 
143 486 U.S. 196, 199–01 (1988). 
144 Id. at 202. 
145 See id. 
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Similarly, in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, a 
lower court entered a preliminary injunction based only upon a 
“high likelihood of success” on the merits of the claim that a fed-
eral statute was unconstitutional.146 The Supreme Court then con-
sidered whether that preliminary injunction was a “holding” of un-
constitutionality within the meaning of Section 1252, which grants 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over certain federal orders 
“holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional.”147 The Court an-
swered in the affirmative and stated that “it should make little dif-
ference whether the court stated conclusively that a statute was un-
constitutional, or merely said it was likely, so long as the injunction 
granted enjoined the statute’s operation. This Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction does not turn on such semantic niceties.”148 Thus, the 
Walters Court emphasized the clarity of the results of the applica-
tion of the rule rather than the clarity of the legal rule’s terms—in 
effect, results over doctrine. 
These examples from appellate jurisdiction reflect the divide be-
tween doctrine and results even when the difference in results is 
merely a difference in the available forum. In other words, regard-
less of the consistency of the results of appellate-jurisdiction doc-
trine, there is still an available forum (that is, district court) for liti-
gation of the merits. It seems likely that other areas of jurisdiction, 
such as the jurisdictionality of statutory preconditions, could reflect 
the same divide in a way that resonates even more strongly with 
the lay public because the difference in result may be the differ-
ence between an available forum and no forum at all.149 The differ-
ence between a jurisdictional statute of limitations in the Tucker 
Act for claims against the federal government and a nonjurisdic-
tional limitations period in Title VII perhaps can be explained doc-
trinally by a commitment to stare decisis,150 but the lay person who 
sees a late Title VII claim heard on the merits but a late Tucker 
 
146 473 U.S. 305, 316 (1985). 
147 Id. at 316–18 (quoting and discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1252). 
148 Id. at 317. 
149 I thank Howard Wasserman for raising this point. 
150 Compare John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–36 
(2008) (typing the Tucker Act period as a “more absolute” and unwaivable bar), with 
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (typing the Title VII period as 
a nonjurisdictional and waivable limit). 
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Act claim forever barred may find that rationale very difficult to 
swallow in light of the disconnect in the results. 
The rub of all of this is that the promotion of jurisdictional doc-
trinal clarity has its own complications because the potential tar-
gets of that clarity have different motivations, perceptions, and in-
terests. These differences can create tensions between observers. 
The difficulty of reconciling those tensions clouds attempts to de-
velop clear and simple jurisdictional doctrine. 
4. Choosing Between Clarities 
One could ignore or treat cavalierly these formation complexi-
ties, but doing so does not make the formulation process easy, for 
the rulemaker must still choose a particular clear jurisdictional 
boundary. That choice implicates the difficult question of where to 
set the boundary, a question that entails consideration of all of the 
jurisdictional goals and policies. In a nutshell, jurisdictional clarity 
and simplicity do not avoid the need to address these complex con-
siderations. Three examples illustrate why that is the case. 
a. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
The scope of the constitutional “arising under” grant151 was es-
tablished in 1824, when the Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of 
the United States held that any federal “ingredient” of the original 
cause gave rise to federal jurisdiction.152 When the statutory grant 
was passed fifty-one years later in 1875 with language nearly iden-
tical to the constitutional grant,153 it would have been perfectly rea-
sonable for clarity purposes for the Supreme Court to have inter-
preted the scope of the statutory grant identically to the scope of 
the constitutional grant.154 Instead, the Court imposed the well-
pleaded complaint rule,155 which the Court views as narrower than 
 
151 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
152 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
153 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). 
154 The Court in fact did so initially. See Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason 
for It; It’s Just our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Pur-
poses of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 603–04 (1987) (detailing 
the history); Freer, supra note 53, at 313–17 (providing a similar discussion). 
155 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908). 
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the Osborn interpretation of the constitutional grant.156 The well-
pleaded complaint rule is, at best, a modest improvement in clarity; 
both tests demarcate the jurisdictional boundary in relatively clear 
fashion. The real import of the well-pleaded complaint rule is that 
it purports to shift that boundary to restrict federal-question juris-
diction.157 The statutory choice thus is not between a clear jurisdic-
tional boundary and an unclear one, but between two (or among 
more) relatively clear jurisdictional boundaries that differ in scope. 
Making such a choice is not easy; it involves a difficult balancing 
of the need for federal jurisdiction over important questions of 
federal law, the need to control federal dockets, the accurate inter-
pretation of the scope of federal judicial power, and the vindication 
of party preference. A recent illustration of this complex balancing 
is Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, in which the 
Supreme Court considered whether to apply the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction.158 The 
Court did apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, in part because a 
contrary rule would broaden federal jurisdiction to the detriment 
of state-court competence and authority.159 Justice Stevens con-
curred but noted the strong countervailing need for uniformity in 
federal patent law.160 Others have noted additional relevant consid-
erations, including a potential “pro-patent bias” in the Federal Cir-
 
156 See City of Chi. v. Coll. of Int’l Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (1997) (stating that 
cases “within the meaning of § 1331 compose a collection smaller than the one fitting 
within the similarly worded Clause in Article III”). I note that there is some dis-
agreement about the breadth of the Osborn rule, with some commentators taking an 
expansive view, see, e.g., John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the 
Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1829, 
1832–33 (1998), and others taking a narrower view, see, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Ar-
ticle III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 807–09 (2004). I assume for the 
illustrative purposes in this Article that the well-pleaded complaint rule is, as the 
Court seems to view it, a narrower grant of jurisdiction than Article III’s “arising un-
der” grant. 
157 William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Di-
rectly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 890, 891 (1967) (explaining that inter-
preting the statutory grant co-extensively with Osborn would have been impractical 
because “arising under” cases would have flooded the federal courts). 
158 535 U.S. 826, 827 (2002). 
159 Id. at 832. 
160 Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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cuit,161 the need to respect the parties’ choice of forum,162 and the ef-
fect on federal dockets.163 The point is not that the Supreme Court 
got it wrong in adopting the well-pleaded complaint rule in the 
patent context or even in Mottley; rather, the point is that the 
adoption of the relatively clear rule could not escape the complex 
and uncertain policy questions that underlie jurisdictional line-
drawing. 
b. Jurisdictional Characterization 
It can be difficult to determine whether a particular statutory 
limitation on a claim—such as a limitations period, a suit prerequi-
site, or a statutory coverage condition—is jurisdictional or not.164 
To inject clarity into these jurisdictional characterization questions, 
the Court recently has implemented a clear statement rule and pre-
sumption. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. considered whether the em-
ployer-numerosity requirement of Title VII—the statutory cover-
age condition that an employer have at least fifteen employees—
was a jurisdictional requirement or a forfeitable element of the 
claim.165 The Court acknowledged that Congress could have made 
the employer-numerosity requirement jurisdictional, but it stated 
that it would presume that such a statutory coverage requirement 
was not jurisdictional unless Congress clearly demarcated it as 
such.166 Similarly, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, one of the ju-
risdictional cases from last Term, the Court followed the Arbaugh 
presumption to hold that the registration requirement in Sec-
 
161 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 25–30, 54 (1989). 
162 See Field, supra note 6, at 722 (“Simplification of much jurisdictional doctrine 
would result from generally espousing the position that, where Congress has given 
concurrent jurisdiction, the federal courts should respect the parties’ choice of fo-
rum.”). 
163 Justice Brennan has made this point in a different line-drawing case. See Walters 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 349 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is simply too burdensome for this Court to bear mandatory direct jurisdiction 
over every preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and other pretrial or-
der in cases potentially implicating the constitutionality of federal statutes.”). 
164 See Dodson, supra note 13, at 56. 
165 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). 
166 Id. at 514–16. 
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tion 411(a) of the Copyright Act was a waivable precondition 
rather than a jurisdictional requirement.167 
Clear statement rules and presumptions are useful doctrinal 
clarification devices. They help guide lower courts in their interpre-
tation of jurisdictional characterization questions, give instructions 
to Congress on how to ensure that boundaries are properly typed 
jurisdictional, and make it clearer to litigants what is jurisdictional 
and what is not. And, as I explain in more detail later in this Arti-
cle, they can facilitate the smooth coordination of different law-
speaking institutions.168 For these reasons, I elsewhere have sup-
ported the use of clear statement presumptions in characterizing 
the jurisdictionality of removal provisions.169 
But we ought not to overvalue these clarity-facilitating features 
of clear statement rules and presumptions, for they raise their own 
uncertainties. What kind of a clear statement overcomes the pre-
sumption?170 Arbaugh explained that a sufficient clear statement 
would “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer . . . to the jurisdiction 
of the district courts,”171 but the test cannot be as simple as that, for 
the Court has held jurisdictional a limit that does not refer to juris-
diction,172 has held nonjurisdictional a limit that does refer to juris-
diction,173 and has waffled on a different limit referring to jurisdic-
tion—calling it “more absolute” instead of “jurisdictional.”174 A 
similar problem arises in other jurisdictional clear statement rules, 
namely Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.175 That the Supreme 
Court decided four cases just this past Term involving jurisdictional 
 
167 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, 1244–45 (2010) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). 
168 See infra text accompanying notes 232–35.   
169 See Dodson, supra note 13, at 66–71. 
170 This is a common problem of clear statement rules. See generally William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) (cataloguing variants of clear 
statement rules and the levels of clarity required for each). 
171 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 
394 (1982)). 
172 See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–11 (2007). 
173 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). 
174 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 135–36 (2008) 
(struggling to classify a statute of limitations that includes jurisdictional language). 
175 See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1202 (2010) (confronting the question 
of how clear a state court decision has to be on whether it relies on an independent 
and adequate state ground to preclude Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction). 
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characterization inquiries suggests that its attempt to clarify juris-
dictional characterization issues is succeeding only modestly at 
best.176 
Further, the use of clear statement rules and presumptions 
masks the more complicated question of what direction they 
should take. In other words, should the presumption be against, or 
in favor of, jurisdiction? Arbaugh and Michigan v. Long imposed 
presumptions that broaden federal jurisdiction,177 but they just as 
easily could (and perhaps should) have imposed a converse pre-
sumption against jurisdiction. Although there might be good rea-
sons to choose one over the other, that choice necessarily entails a 
complex, ex ante consideration of underlying reasons and policy 
values.178 Arbaugh, for one, did consider the efficiency and econ-
omy implications of typing statutory coverage limitations as juris-
dictional,179 but it also could (and perhaps should) have considered 
implications on federal docket loads, the legitimacy problems of 
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries if Congress actually in-
tended the limitation to be jurisdictional, federalism effects, and 
the relative merits of jurisdiction-expanding decisions versus juris-
diction-restricting decisions.180 In most cases, a full consideration of 
 
176 See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537–39 (2010) (determining that the 
ninety-day time limit in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) is not jurisdictional); United Student 
Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377–78 (2010) (resolving whether various 
bankruptcy filing requirements are jurisdictional); Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S. 
Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) (resolving the jurisdictionality of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)); Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 
130 S. Ct. 584, 597 (2009) (holding that the National Railroad Adjustment Board’s 
conferencing requirement is nonjurisdictional). 
177 See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (presuming, absent a 
clear statement of jurisdictionality from Congress, that a statutory limitation did not 
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 
(1983) (presuming, absent a clear statement that the state court decision rests upon an 
independent and adequate state ground, that the state court decided the issue accord-
ing to federal law, rendering the decision reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
178 For my own attempt to balance these difficult weightings in the removal context, 
see Dodson, supra note 13. 
179 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–14 (adopting the presumption “mindful of the conse-
quences of typing the fifteen-employee threshold a determinant of subject-matter ju-
risdiction”). For more on the Arbaugh presumption, see Stephen R. Brown, Hearing 
Congress’s Jurisdictional Speech: Giving Meaning to the “Clearly-States” Test in Ar-
baugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 Willamette L. Rev. 33 (2009). 
180 See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications 
for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 95, 149–58 (2009) (identifying these 
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what direction a presumption should take will be complex and un-
certain. 
c. Immunity Waiver 
Although it is questionable whether the state sovereign immu-
nity exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment is a limitation on a 
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,181 the immunity “par-
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”182 and thus is useful for 
illustration. One of the longstanding features of state sovereign 
immunity is that the state can waive it.183 But what constitutes 
waiver? Because immunity is a question of state sovereignty that 
implicates sensitive federalism relations, the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to find immunity waived absent a state’s clear indi-
cation of intent to do so,184 a sort of clear statement rule with a pre-
sumption in favor of immunity and against federal jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, in Lapides v. Board of Regents, the Court held, un-
der the well-worn aegis that “jurisdictional rules should be clear,” 
that the state’s voluntary removal of a case from state court to fed-
eral court manifested an implicit waiver of state sovereign immu-
nity in federal court.185 
The Lapides rule is relatively clear and simple (at least for re-
moval186), but why the Court chose that particular rule as opposed 
to another is not. The Court instead could have clarified the pre-
sumption against waiver that it previously had articulated by, for 
example, making waiver effective only upon a clear statement in a 
 
factors and exploring the benefits of enlarged or contracted federal jurisdiction in 
general). 
181 See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 19–20 (2008) (arguing 
that it is not). 
182 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). 
183 See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883). 
184 College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 675–81 (1999). 
185 535 U.S. 613, 616, 621 (2002). 
186 Even in the context of removal, though, the Lapides rule can be uncertain. For 
example, does a state waive immunity if a non-state co-defendant removes the case in 
violation of the unanimity requirement for removal and the state fails to move to re-
mand within the thirty-day deadline provided by the removal statute? See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c) (2006) (imposing the thirty-day deadline for remand motions); Chi., Rock 
Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247–48 (1900) (imposing the unanimity 
requirement). 
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written court filing made by the state. Immunity waiver is, after all, 
a matter of federal common law,187 and so the Court had a variety 
of options in crafting a clear waiver rule. Why it chose the rule that 
it did depended upon a number of complicating factors, including 
consistency, fairness, and deference to state sovereignty.188 
d. Summary 
These examples show that even when clear jurisdictional 
boundaries can be created, the choice to adopt one over another is 
not at all simple or clear. That choice, institutional inadequacies, 
and competing jurisdictional policies present substantial obstacles 
to the promulgation of clear jurisdictional rules. 
B. The Effect of Implementation 
The intricacies of clarity do not end with successful promulga-
tion. The interpretation and application processes present their 
own challenges, each with its own effects on jurisdictional clarity. 
Interpretative gloss may make an otherwise clear and simple rule 
anything but. And, even if the rule and its interpretative gloss are 
clear, the application could be complicated or uncertain. Obscurity 
in these components of implementation can contaminate the whole 
doctrine. 
1. Complications of Interpretation 
Clear jurisdictional rules rarely do perfectly what is asked of 
them because the interpretive process creates obscurity. This ob-
scurity can happen when a court interprets a rule by using more 
uncertain terminology, applies the rule in an odd factual setting, or 
creates exceptions to the rule.189 
The finality rules of appellate jurisdiction illustrate these prob-
lems of interpretation. Two statutes are in play here: Section 1257, 
which limits Supreme Court jurisdiction over state decisions to 
cases in which the highest state court rendered a final judgment or 
 
187 Lapides, 535 U.S. at 622–23. 
188 Id. at 622. 
189 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128 (2d ed. 1994); Schauer, supra note 56, 
at 196–206; Sunstein, supra note 56, at 986–89. 
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decree,190 and Section 1291, which limits the appellate jurisdiction 
of courts of appeals to “final decisions” of district courts.191 Both 
require a “final” decision, and the Supreme Court has admitted 
that that requirement is clear enough: no appellate jurisdiction 
when anything in the case still remains to be decided.192 But that is 
not how the interpretation of “final” has gone for either statute. 
Instead, the Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the 
finality requirement of Section 1257.193 If exceptions in and of 
themselves were not confusing enough, the Court has crafted ex-
tremely complicated and difficult doctrinal tests for them. Thus, 
the Court’s finality exceptions include (1) cases in which “the fed-
eral issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings pre-
ordained,” (2) cases “in which the federal issue, finally decided by 
the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision re-
gardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings,” 
(3) cases in which “the federal claim has been finally de-
cided, . . . but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be 
had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case,” and (4) cases in 
which “the federal issue has been finally decided . . . and where re-
versal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of 
any further litigation on the relevant [claim].”194 
Finality under Section 1291 fares no better. The Court has given 
that finality requirement a “practical rather than a technical con-
struction,” leading to the characterization of some patently nonfi-
nal judgments as final under the collateral-order doctrine.195 Fur-
ther, the test for the appealability of nonfinal collateral orders is a 
flabby one: whether the order is “collateral to” the merits of a non-
final action, “too important” to be denied immediate review, and 
“too independent” of the underlying claims to require deferral of 
appellate review.196 To make matters even worse, the Court has re-
 
190 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006). 
191 Id. § 1291. 
192 Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (stating that 
“[c]onsiderations of English usage as well as those of judicial policy” suggest that the 
certiorari statute precludes review “where anything further remains to be determined 
by a State court, no matter how dissociated from the only federal issue”). 
193 Id. at 124. 
194 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975). 
195 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
196 Id. 
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fused to ameliorate the uncertainty by, for example, revising its in-
terpretative gloss or at least cabining the existing precedent. To the 
contrary, the Court has left open the possibility that other nonfinal 
decisions might be deemed to be final.197 
Congress has acquiesced in the Court’s interpretation of “fi-
nal”198 and, instead of restoring clarity through statute, has dele-
gated the responsibility for determining what is “final” under Sec-
tion 1291 to the Court’s rulemaking powers.199 Thus, in addition to 
illustrating the complexities of interpretation, the finality rule also 
highlights the difficulty of cooperative clear rule creation that I dis-
cussed above in the context of institutional capacities. In short, the 
interpretation of jurisdictional rules often reduces their level of 
clarity and simplicity,200 and sometimes even with the acquiescence 
of the institution that designed them in the first place. 
2. Complications of Application 
Even if a relatively clear and simple jurisdictional rule comes 
through the interpretive process unscathed, the application of that 
rule can be difficult and uncertain, particularly if the facts are not 
easily discovered or understandable. Application difficulties arise 
often in jurisdictional rules because such rules are supposed to be 
applied early in the litigation, usually before any discovery has 
 
197 See Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (declining to extend 
the collateral-order doctrine in the case at bar but expressing willingness to do so in 
the context of a formal rule promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act). 
198 Congress has left the relevant language unchanged since 1789, despite the inter-
pretations that the Court has imposed. Compare An Act to Establish the Judicial 
Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789) (“[F]inal decrees and 
judgments in civil actions in a district court . . . may be reexamined, and reversed or 
affirmed in a circuit court . . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of ap-
peals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts 
of the United States . . . .”). 
199 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006). 
200 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 961 (stating that interpretation of rules necessarily 
involves discretion). There are some counterexamples. The statutory language deem-
ing a corporation to be a citizen, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, of the state of its 
“principal place of business” was recently interpreted to mean, in most cases, the state 
where the corporation’s headquarters is located. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 
1181, 1185–86 (2010). That interpretation clarifies an ambiguous term in the statute 
that had produced some uncertainty in the lower courts. 
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changed hands and while facts are still largely unknown.201 To com-
pound this difficulty, the legal tests for jurisdiction have become 
more complex, fact-dependent, and fact-intensive.202 
As an example, take the amount-in-controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction. The diversity statute sets a threshold limit: no 
diversity jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy “ex-
ceeds . . . $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs . . . .”203 The rule is 
fairly clear, and the interpretation of that rule is also fairly clear. 
An amount in controversy that is exactly—but not over—$75,000 
will be denied diversity jurisdiction.204 The Supreme Court has con-
strued the amount to include non-monetary relief, and that direc-
tive is also clear.205 But how does one calculate the value of non-
monetary relief when the threshold is measured in dollars and 
cents? There is an open interpretive question of what legal stan-
dard should govern the valuation of injunctive relief,206 but my fo-
cus is on the deeper application difficulties. Those application diffi-
culties are simplified somewhat by the superimposed legal rule that 
the plaintiff’s good-faith claim controls unless it cannot exceed the 
threshold to a legal certainty.207 But the question still calls for a fac-
tual assessment that is both unpredictable and complicated, par-
ticularly when the jurisdictional amount is based on injunctive re-
 
201 For an excellent discussion of some of the issues surrounding the factual proof of 
jurisdiction, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 973, 984–
99 (2006). 
202 S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 489, 505 (2010). 
203 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
204 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez, 149 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 
1998) (dismissing a claim for exactly the jurisdictional amount). But see De Aguilar v. 
Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408–12 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing federal diversity jurisdic-
tion when the plaintiff alleged less than the threshold amount if (1) the defendant 
shows that the actual contested amount exceeds the jurisdictional limit and (2) the 
plaintiff is unable to show that “it is certain that he will not be able to recover more” 
than alleged). 
205 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347–48 (1977); 
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1934). 
206 See Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure § 4.5 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the plaintiff-
viewpoint rule, the defendant-viewpoint rule, and the either-party rule); Brittain 
Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000 Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Re-
lief?, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1013, 1020–24 (1998). The choice between these view-
point rules implicates the complexities of choice that I discuss above. See supra text 
accompanying notes 151–188. 
207 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938). 
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lief, other nonmonetary relief, or punitive damages.208 And these 
“cases are legion.”209 
But even relatively straightforward compensatory money dam-
ages can prove difficult to evaluate. In one typical case, for exam-
ple, a personal injury plaintiff who sustained a broken thumb in an 
automobile accident invoked diversity jurisdiction alleging more 
than the jurisdictional threshold based primarily on pain and suf-
fering.210 Suspecting that the amount-in-controversy threshold 
could not be met, despite the plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary, 
the district court held a hearing and examined “an extensive re-
cord,” including the plaintiff’s deposition and the testimony of 
three doctors who treated the plaintiff.211 That case illustrates the 
difficulties of applying even a bright-line rule of a dollar threshold 
to complicated, fact-intensive cases. 
Similar application difficulties can be found elsewhere. For ex-
ample, the test for an individual’s citizenship for diversity jurisdic-
tion purposes is that individual’s “domicile,” which may be 
changed by establishing a physical presence in a new state and in-
tending to reside there permanently.212 The legal test is simple 
enough, but factually determining an individual’s intent to reside 
permanently can be complicated. As Richard Freer has colorfully 
written, “Most of us do not jump up one day and cry out, ‘I have 
formed the intent to make this state my permanent home!’”213 
Rather, the issue is nuanced and often disputed, and courts often 
look to a variety of factors to resolve it, including voter registra-
tion, tax payment, automobile registration, driver’s license registra-
tion, home ownership, and location of bank accounts.214 Other doc-
trines with potentially difficult and uncertain factual application 
 
208 See Armistead M. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District 
Court, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 734, 738 (1925) (noting that the determination of the 
amount in controversy can be “quite complex” and singling out injunctive relief as 
presenting a particularly difficult inquiry that is likely to yield “inconsistent and con-
fusing” results). 
209 Id. at 738. 
210 Burns v. Anderson, 502 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1974). 
211 Id. at 972. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the 
Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed. Id. 
212 See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974). 
213 Freer, supra note 206, § 4.5. 
214 See id. 
DODSON_PRE_PP 2/23/2011  8:47 PM 
2011] The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity 45 
problems include CAFA diversity jurisdiction,215 supplemental ju-
risdiction,216 and the substantiality test for federal-question jurisdic-
tion.217 Each of these demonstrates that difficulties in factual appli-
cation can undermine the relative clarity of the governing legal 
rule.218 Together with the interpretive overlays, the implementation 
of even a clear jurisdictional rule can lead to confusion and com-
plexity. 
C. Multi-Instrumentalism 
Part of the reason for many of these formation and implementa-
tion difficulties is that jurisdictional clarity lacks a consistent and 
uniform purpose. The mantra seeks clear and simple rules primar-
ily for cost savings and legitimacy gains. But there are different 
ways to seek these goals. And jurisdictional clarity has an addi-
tional, underemphasized purpose: facilitating institutional relation-
ships. These instrumentalist features can be in tension with each 
other. 
1. Cost Control 
The most emphasized goal of jurisdictional clarity is the conser-
vation of litigant and judicial resources and the enhanced judicial 
legitimacy that flows from proper attention to jurisdictional 
boundaries. The idea, described in more detail above, is that clear 
jurisdictional rules will result in less jurisdictional litigation, easier 
resolution of any litigation that does arise, and improved percep-
 
215 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (requiring the declination of CAFA 
diversity jurisdiction if, among other requirements, “greater than two-thirds of the 
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed”). 
216 See id. § 1367(c)(2) (allowing declination of jurisdiction if the supplemental claim 
“substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has 
original jurisdiction”). 
217 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946); see also Field, supra note 6, at 
691–94 (explaining why the substantiality requirement is difficult in application). 
218 For what it is worth, the Supreme Court appears to understand this. See Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1185–86 (2010) (choosing a test for corporate citizen-
ship under the diversity statute in large part because of “the need for judicial admini-
stration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible”). 
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tions of courts that do not overstep their jurisdictional bounda-
ries.219 
But the instrumentalism is more nuanced than that simple for-
mula. For example, although jurisdictional requirements and mer-
its requirements generally should avoid overlap because jurisdic-
tional issues must be decided up front, while merits issues should 
be decided upon a fully developed record,220 there is good reason to 
think that overlap is neither unworkable nor costly. Kevin Cler-
mont, for example, has explored ways in which the competing in-
terests of jurisdiction and merits can be accommodated in overlap-
ping inquiries.221 An overlap may even generate cost-saving 
advantages, if a quick look at the merits through jurisdiction-
related hearings can induce mutually beneficial settlement or the 
narrowing of merits issues. I do not mean to express disagreement 
here with the general goal of cost-saving, but I do mean to suggest 
that the method of achieving it is neither certain nor fully articu-
lated. 
2. Legitimacy Enhancement 
Similarly, jurisdictional clarity is said to promote the goal of en-
hanced judicial legitimacy, but the methods of achieving that goal 
are inconsistent. Because overstepping a jurisdictional boundary is 
to act unlawfully and call into doubt the propriety of any resulting 
judgment,222 federal courts might be tempted to create clarity in ju-
 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 15–24. Here, I treat judicial legitimacy as an 
instrumental value that flows from jurisdictional clarity, as opposed to a normative 
value flowing from a conceptualization of jurisdiction as power. The latter value relies 
on a conceptual distinction between jurisdictionality and non-jurisdictionality that has 
been forcefully criticized elsewhere. See Lee, supra note 10, at 1613–21. 
220 See Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Requiring assess-
ment of a defendant’s motive in raising a patent counterclaim or the counterclaim’s 
relative strength wastes judicial resources by inviting ‘unhappy interactions between 
jurisdiction and the merits.’” (quoting Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 
1988))); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 507–09 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (chastising the majority for its willingness to look at the merits as an influenc-
ing factor in appellate jurisdiction); Wasserman, supra note 10, at 1548 (arguing that 
there should be no overlap between jurisdiction and merits). 
221 Clermont, supra note 201, at 979–80 (proposing a solution for adjudicating factual 
disputes that affect both jurisdiction and the merits). 
222 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (“It is a funda-
mental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon 
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risdictional rules by constructing presumptions or interpretations 
against federal jurisdiction.223 In the same vein, because overstep-
ping jurisdictional boundaries can encroach on the prerogatives of 
other law-speaking institutions,224 federal courts might be tempted 
to decline jurisdiction when other institutions lay greater claim to 
the issue. The abstention doctrines are prime examples.225 Finally, 
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries transgresses the constitu-
tional commitment of separation of powers, because Congress—
not the judiciary—has the primary authority for granting federal 
jurisdiction.226 The idea is that judicial legitimacy is enhanced when 
it at least is clear that the court is not overstepping its jurisdictional 
authorization. 
But underasserting jurisdiction also can erode legitimacy. Courts 
that refuse to hear the merits of an important case for questionable 
jurisdictional grounds can suffer in the public eye. Some of the Su-
preme Court’s most famous standing cases are prime examples.227 
In addition, the judicial assertion of power to decline jurisdiction in 
the face of a clear affirmative congressional grant also erodes judi-
cial legitimacy for some of the same separation-of-powers reasons 
that counsel against overstepping congressional boundaries.228 Fi-
 
federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be 
neither disregarded nor evaded.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 1615–21 (tying proper juris-
diction to enhanced legitimacy of judgment). 
223 For examples, see supra text accompanying notes 151–88 (discussing the well-
pleaded complaint rule, clear statement rules and presumptions, and waiver rules for 
state sovereign immunity). 
224 See Lees, supra note 8, at 1460 (restricting jurisdictionality to rules that “oper-
ate[] to shift authority from one law-speaking institution to another”). 
225 See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 551. 
226 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a 
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 
227 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (dismiss-
ing a constitutional challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance on a novel prudential stand-
ing ground); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Mini-
malism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951, 2009 (2005) (suggesting 
that the Court’s legitimacy may have suffered from its artful dodge in Newdow); see 
also Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1373 (1988) (“[Some commentators] have con-
cluded that the doctrine of standing is either a judicial mask for the exercise of pru-
dence to avoid decisionmaking or a sophisticated manipulation for the sub rosa deci-
sion of cases on their merits.”). 
228 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 170, at 598 (arguing that clear statement rules 
and interpretive presumptions suffer from countermajoritarian problems); Daniel J. 
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nally, underasserting jurisdiction can leave litigants in a suboptimal 
forum,229 or perhaps even without a forum at all,230 resulting in an 
injustice that can erode legitimacy. For these reasons, underasser-
tion can damage legitimacy values. 
Thus, to be true to the goal of enhancing legitimacy, jurisdic-
tional clarity must be double-sided—clear both for exercising and 
for declining jurisdiction. Aside from making jurisdictional clarity 
doubly difficult, that mode of clarity rubs up against a third, under-
stated goal of jurisdictional clarity. 
3. Addressing Institutional Relationships 
That third goal is the facilitation of institutional relationships. 
Federal appellate jurisdiction involves the functioning of the intra-
branch relationship between district and appellate courts. Other ju-
risdictional grants involve the inter-system relationships between 
federal and state courts. Still others involve the inter-branch rela-
tionship between federal courts and Congress or executive agen-
cies. Jurisdictional clarity seeks to define the demarcations of these 
divisions, and, in the process, promote harmony between them.231 
Good fences make good neighbors. 
 
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 378 (2002) 
(describing arguments that judicial lawmaking raises legitimacy concerns on federal-
ism and separation-of-powers grounds); Redish, supra note 95, at 74–75 (arguing that 
abstention doctrines are illegitimate usurpations of congressional authority). But see 
Fitzgerald, supra note 94, at 1245 (arguing that Article III originally contemplated a 
judicial role for establishing and exercising jurisdiction). One might contend that judi-
cial usurpation of jurisdiction is more offensive than judicial declination of jurisdiction 
because Congress acquiesces in—and perhaps even silently delegates to the court—a 
certain amount of judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 
99, at 1843 (suggesting that legislators may expect courts to fine-tune statutory com-
mands through the process of interpretation). There is truth to that contention today, 
but it does not explain how the latter practice developed in the first place. For a novel 
argument attempting to reconcile some of these problems, see Friedman, supra note 
94, at 2–3 (proposing a “dialogic” developmental process). 
229 The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a neutral federal forum when 
state court bias is likely, but abstention doctrines can funnel such cases back to state 
court. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudica-
tion, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1869, 1899–904 (2008). 
230 See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 
(2008) (holding the six-year limitations period for suits in the Court of Federal Claims 
to be a quasi-jurisdictional limitation sufficient to negate a purported waiver that 
would have allowed the suit to proceed). 
231 Lees, supra note 8, at 1460. 
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That functionality, though, runs up against the friction that re-
sults if the fences stand in the wrong place. It is not unusual for 
Congress to grant expansive federal jurisdiction, even over cases 
that might better be resolved by institutional bodies other than the 
federal courts.232 Institutional jockeying and disagreements can re-
sult.233 
Jurisdictional clarity has a role to play in these inter-institutional 
conversations. That role usually is manifested through underasser-
tion doctrines such as abstention doctrines, clear statement rules 
and presumptions, and jurisdiction-limiting line-drawing.234 The 
idea is that self-limitation of jurisdictional prerogative preserves 
harmonious relationships by avoiding encroachment into other in-
stitutions’ spheres of authority.235 Unfortunately, this institutional 
demarcation function of jurisdictional clarity is in tension with the 
legitimacy function of jurisdictional clarity, which condemns judi-
cial usurpation or abdication of jurisdictional authority unless itself 
authorized by Congress. 
IV. THE PRICE OF CLARITY 
As I have argued above, difficulties in design, implementation, 
and instrumentalism all erode the ideal of clear and simple jurisdic-
tional rules. Nonetheless, the ideal may be attainable if the rule-
maker ignores the costs of attaining it. These include the cost of 
 
232 The diversity statute is a prime example. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). The so-
lution might be for Congress just to be clearer with its jurisdictional legislation, but, as 
I have argued, that presents its own challenges. See supra text accompanying notes 
120–22. 
233 In one memorable case wholly within the federal-court system, the Seventh Cir-
cuit and Federal Circuit went toe-to-toe over the propriety of the other’s jurisdiction 
in a patent case. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 806–07 
(1988) (discussing the procedural history and finally resolving the disagreement). 
234 See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Con-
gress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the 
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
242 (1985))); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“In traditionally sensi-
tive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear 
statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into is-
sue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.”). 
235 I note that the Court has used presumptions to overassert jurisdiction as well, see 
supra note 177, which may exacerbate any inter-institutional tension. 
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clarity itself and the opportunity cost of underutilizing the benefits 
of uncertainty.236 In this Part, I explore these costs through the lens 
of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
A. The Costs of Clarity and Simplicity 
The well-pleaded complaint rule is a rare example of a clear and 
simple jurisdictional rule that has withstood the complexities and 
difficulties that undermine most attempts at jurisdictional clarity. 
But, in many ways, it is the exception that proves the rule, for it at-
tains this clarity and simplicity at a substantial cost. That cost mani-
fests itself in three ways. 
I have discussed two of those manifestations already. Because 
the well-pleaded complaint rule is almost certainly the result of 
pragmatic judicial lawmaking for purposes of controlling the fed-
eral docket irrespective of the original meaning of the federal 
“arising under” statute,237 the well-pleaded complaint rule incurs 
the legitimacy costs that I have articulated above.238 And, as dis-
cussed above, the well-pleaded complaint rule is an arbitrary line 
largely dissociated from the complex undercurrents of policies that 
should inform where to set that line.239 
Taking those undercurrents into consideration demonstrates the 
third cost of the well-pleaded complaint rule: its gross inaccuracy.240 
The entire basis for federal “arising under” jurisdiction (and fed-
eral jurisdiction in general) is the idea that forum matters. Fed-
eral courts are seen as experts in federal law and thus better than 
state courts in interpreting federal law with accuracy,241 uniform-
 
236 I rely primarily on logic, theory, example, and—when available—empirical evi-
dence to support these claims. Sadly, few empirical studies are available. More em-
pirical testing should be done to bear out my theoretical assessments. 
237 See Doernberg, supra note 154, at 603–04; Freer, supra note 53, at 311–17. 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 227–28. 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 157–63. 
240 For more indictments of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Cohen, supra note 
157, at 915; Doernberg, supra note 154, at 598–99 & n.12; Redish, supra note 24, at 
1794–95. 
241 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 
(2005) (explaining that federal-question jurisdiction would enable such issues to come 
before judges with more expertise in federal law); The American Law Institute, Study 
of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 164–65 (1969) (“The 
federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and ap-
plication of federal law which would be lost if federal question cases were given to the 
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ity,242 and appropriate sensitivity to federal interests.243 Empirical 
studies have tended to show that a federal forum makes a differ-
ence for removed cases,244 and the amount of wrangling over forum 
suggests that parties believe in its importance.245 
If the essential purpose of federal jurisdiction is to provide a 
needed federal forum over disputed issues of federal law, the well-
pleaded complaint rule is a poor way of doing so because it is sub-
stantially overinclusive and underinclusive.246 Because the well-
pleaded complaint rule times the jurisdictional determination be-
fore the answer, it allows federal jurisdiction over all cases in which 
a federal claim appears on the face of a complaint, even if the fed-
eral claim is not in dispute,247 and even when important state claims 
 
state courts.”); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable 
Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (2003) (asserting that state judges “are not ex-
perts on federal law and, with great respect to them, they are not good at it”); Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105–06 (1977) (arguing that 
federal courts are more solicitous of federal civil rights than state courts are). But see, 
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judi-
ciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 256 (1988) (arguing that the debate over parity between 
state and federal courts is unclear and does not lend itself well to empirical testing); 
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 Const. Comment. 599, 599–600 
(1999) (arguing that “gay litigants seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have 
generally fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts”). 
242 See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (referring to the “hope of uniformity”); Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816); see also Paul J. Mishkin, The 
Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1953) (assert-
ing that federal jurisdiction is key to establishing uniformity of federal law). But see 
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1639 (2008) (arguing 
that uniformity is overrated). 
243 See The Federalist No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (predicting that states would not scrupulously protect federal interests); James 
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the 
United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 713 n.314 (2004) (describing how the Supreme 
Court has relied on perceptions of state-court hostility to federal interests in extend-
ing federal jurisdiction interests). But see, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of 
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of 
state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism.”). 
244 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell 
L. Rev. 581, 593–95 (1998) (showing that plaintiff win rates are lower in removed 
cases). 
245 See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1905. 
246 This is a common failing of rules (as opposed to standards). See Sullivan, supra 
note 56, at 58; Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992–93. 
247 See Doernberg, supra note 154, at 652–53. 
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remain.248 And it shuts out of federal district court questions of fed-
eral law that arise only by way of an answer or counterclaim, even 
if those questions of federal law are the only disputed issues in the 
case.249 
In short, the well-pleaded complaint rule’s clarity-enhancing vir-
tues—early and easy determination—are completely dissociated 
from the very purpose of federal “arising under” jurisdiction. The 
result is a costly misallocation in federal and state judicial re-
sources, with state courts hearing many federal claims and federal 
courts hearing many state claims.250 
Given the inherent complexities in jurisdictional clarity gener-
ally, it seems unlikely that clear and simple jurisdictional rules 
could be designed and implemented in other areas without simply 
ignoring—as the well-pleaded complaint rule does—those com-
plexities and uncertainties and thus incurring similar costs. The 
well-pleaded complaint rule thus aptly illustrates the price of clar-
ity and the sacrifices it entails. 
B. The Value of Uncertainty and Complexity 
The second cost of clarity is the missed opportunity to reap the 
benefits of uncertainty in jurisdictional rules. Many of these bene-
fits have been explored in the debate between mandates and dis-
cretion in jurisdictional doctrine, but I will briefly recapitulate 
them here. 
First, uncertainty can improve accuracy. As with the well-
pleaded complaint rule, ex ante clarity and simplicity often lead to 
gross misalignment with the underlying jurisdictional policies.251 
 
248 A district court does have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over nondiverse state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006). 
249 See Freer, supra note 53, at 318. It is possible that the Supreme Court would ul-
timately hear such a case on appeal from the state courts. Mottley itself is a famous 
example. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 472–74 (1911) 
(hearing a federal defense on appeal from state court). But such cases are extremely 
rare given the Supreme Court’s highly restricted docket. 
250 For more on the accuracy costs of federal jurisdiction over state claims, see Jona-
than Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of 
State Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1674 n.3 (2003) (listing examples of erroneous 
federal-court interpretations of state law). 
251 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 228, at 383–90 (arguing that Congress has not contem-
plated changes in litigation, federalism, and political structure when enacting many 
jurisdictional statutes). 
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Uncertainty, however, to the extent it is coupled with judicial dis-
cretion, can provide room for “flexibility, fine-tuning, recognition 
of difference, and accommodation of unforeseen developments.”252 
It can provide opportunities for courts to better implement and ac-
commodate the underlying policies in given circumstances. These 
benefits are particularly true for the area of jurisdiction, in which 
the courts have a strong claim to expertise.253 
Second, uncertainty can hold more interpretative legitimacy. 
Congress may have intentionally drafted a vague or ambiguous ju-
risdictional statute for the very purpose of delegating power to the 
courts to fill that ex ante uncertainty with case-specific accommo-
dations of jurisdictional policies.254 The refusal to develop a clear 
and simple jurisdictional rule in such instances furthers, rather than 
frustrates, congressional intent. 
Third, uncertainty can promote stability in doctrine. Flexibility 
allows changing circumstances and norms to be accommodated 
without disruption or distortion of precedent. The gradual buildup 
of precedent may make fundamental reform more difficult in the 
long run,255 but it also should make reform less necessary overall 
because the doctrine is crafted in small steps over a longer period 
of time. Uncertainty can also promote stability in inter-branch rela-
tionships. Barry Friedman has argued that uncertainty “tends to 
 
252 Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841. 
253 See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574 (“[C]ourts are functionally better adapted to 
engage in the necessary fine tuning [of jurisdictional rules] than is the legislature.”). 
But see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1963 (2007) (questioning whether district courts can exercise 
broad discretion effectively in matters of procedure); Strong, supra note 202, at 558–
61 (discussing some of the problems of excessive judicial discretion in resolving juris-
dictional issues). 
254 See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the 
Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 Ind. L.J. 211, 228 (1983) 
(“[S]ection 1331 can be seen as a delegation of law-making power in the procedural 
area . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 99, at 1843 (“[T]he legislature, in the light of centu-
ries of experience, may have come to expect the process of interpretation to comprise 
elements of both agency (the court as applier of the legislature’s mandates) and part-
nership (the court as fine tuner of the legislature’s general, and sometimes overly 
general, proscriptions and commands) . . . .”). But see Scalia, supra note 21, at 1183 
(arguing that the “reduction of vague congressional commands into rules that are less 
than a perfect fit is not a frustration of legislative intent because that is what courts 
have traditionally done, and hence what Congress anticipates when it legislates”). 
255 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 
395–404 (1978); Schuck, supra note 73, at 20–21. 
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make actors more cautious, which in the context of the dialogue 
would protect each branch from over-strong assertions of author-
ity, or a failure to back down in the face of contrary views.”256 
Fourth, uncertainty can induce greater sensitivity to the judicial 
function. In a recent and elegant essay, Seana Shiffrin argued that 
clear rules can “spark complacency and automatous behavior,” 
while uncertainty can induce salutary moral deliberation.257 She fo-
cused primarily on the virtues of uncertainty in the regulation of 
primary conduct and the resulting moral deliberation of primary 
actors and lay citizens, rather than the relatively amoral delibera-
tion of secondary legal actors over jurisdictional uncertainty, but 
her arguments suggest that such jurisdictional deliberation has its 
benefits as well. One virtue might be that jurisdictional uncertainty 
allows judges to engage the underlying policies, explore them, try 
them in different circumstances, discard them when they no longer 
make sense, and generally enhance the systemic and dynamic un-
derstanding of the law of jurisdiction. 
Fifth, and perhaps related to the preceding point, uncertainty 
can encourage competition between legal actors that encourages 
healthy debate about jurisdiction. This competition is the converse 
of the clarity-driven functionality of streamlining inter-branch rela-
tionships. The idea here is that different systems work best when 
they are engaged with each other over their proper jurisdictional 
boundaries, as opposed to staying pacifically on their own side of 
the fence. Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff have made this 
point powerfully in the context of their vision of “dialectical feder-
alism,” in which they argued that conflict between state and federal 
courts can promote an open-ended dialogue about legal norms.258 
The same could apply to jurisdictional issues; where clearly defined 
rules might stifle thoughtful discussion, competition may stimulate 
it. 
I do not mean to propose that jurisdictional uncertainty and 
complexity will always lead to these benefits or that, even if they 
do, they are superior to jurisdictional clarity and simplicity. I mean 
 
256 Friedman, supra note 94, at 56 n.260. 
257 Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1221, 1223–25. 
258 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas 
Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). My thanks to Jay Tidmarsh for 
pointing out the parallel to dialectical federalism. 
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instead to argue that jurisdictional uncertainty and complexity 
have their own competing virtues—and clarity and simplicity have 
their own attendant costs—that ought to be taken into account 
when developing jurisdictional doctrine and when evaluating the 
disconnect between the mantra of jurisdictional clarity and the 
state of jurisdictional uncertainty in existing doctrine. 
V. USING CLARITY (AND COMPLEXITY) 
In this Part, I consider whether the lessons of clarity’s complex-
ity and uncertainty can be put to good use. I make two observa-
tions. The first is to advance an explanation for the divergence be-
tween reality and rhetoric noted in Part I: jurisdictional clarity is, in 
most cases, neither clear nor simple, and thus is not realistically at-
tainable. The second is to argue that the largely overlooked prob-
lems of jurisdictional clarity suggest that we ought not overvalue 
the mantra of clarity and simplicity. Instead, the development of 
jurisdictional doctrine should strive for ways to harness the virtues 
of both jurisdictional clarity and jurisdictional uncertainty to 
maximum advantage. 
A. Explaining the Gap 
The inherent complexity and uncertainty of jurisdictional clar-
ity—from design to implementation—suggest an obvious answer to 
the puzzle of why existing jurisdictional doctrine largely fails to 
meet the rhetoric of jurisdictional clarity. Clarity is nice in theory 
but mostly unattainable in practice. When clarity is attained, such 
as in the well-pleaded complaint rule, it so deviates from its under-
lying purposes as to be of questionable justification. 
This Article, then, explains why that existing doctrine does not 
reflect an unrelenting commitment to clear jurisdictional rules. 
Clear rules simply prove too much, and, despite good intentions of 
adhering to them, either rulemakers give up on designing them or 
courts erode them through exceptions and interpretations. Com-
plexity and uncertainty have proven irresistible even for the sim-
plest and clearest of jurisdictional rules, including the Holmes test 
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providing for federal jurisdiction over federal causes of action259 
and the clear “mandatory and jurisdictional” ninety-day deadline 
for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.260 In the 
end, the nature of jurisdictional clarity is itself inherently one of 
nuance, and the resulting embrace of uncertainty is inevitable. 
B. Mixing Clarity and Uncertainty 
Rather than resisting jurisdictional uncertainty and blindly ad-
hering to the illusion of pure jurisdictional clarity, we should con-
sider how best to accommodate, even harness, jurisdictional uncer-
tainty. Doing so can, perhaps paradoxically, make jurisdictional 
clarity a new reality because it need not attempt to accomplish 
more than it can. 
I should note at the outset that the idea of hybridizing clarity and 
uncertainty in crafting legal rules is not new, at least outside of the 
area of subject-matter jurisdiction. As just one example, Martin 
Redish has argued that the “clear and present danger” First 
Amendment test engages a clarity-furthering presumption in favor 
of free speech while using less certain standards to gauge when that 
presumption is overcome.261 
And, recent literature on subject-matter jurisdiction has touted 
the role of hybrid jurisdictional rules, though it tends to center on 
the rules versus standards debate instead of clarity and uncertainty. 
Jonathan Nash, for example, argues that grants of jurisdiction 
should be rule-based, while certain limits on those jurisdictional 
grants should be standards- or discretion-based.262 Although I be-
lieve that the success of his approach depends upon the relative 
scope of the grants and abstention powers, and although I question 
whether the particular line he draws—between grants and absten-
 
259 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1946) (refusing to allow federal jurisdic-
tion over a wholly meritless federal claim); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 
505, 513 (1900) (refusing to find jurisdiction when the federal claim consists solely of 
an incorporation of state law). 
260 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45–47 (1990) (elaborating on tolling princi-
ples). 
261 Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1159, 1182–83 (1982). 
262 Nash, supra note 49, at 10 (“I will argue that rules are more appropriate in estab-
lishing the boundaries of statutory jurisdiction, while the place for standards lies in 
deciding whether or not to abstain.”). 
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tion—is the best, I do think he is right to say that “[i]t is possible, in 
this context, to have one’s cake and eat it, too.”263 
It is possible, I think, from the vantage point of clarity and un-
certainty. In most cases, questions of federal jurisdiction turn out 
to be pretty easy.264 There is broad agreement that, for example, 
Section 1331 is a jurisdictional provision while Title VII’s prohibi-
tion on “discrimination” is not. Similarly, no one disputes that a Ti-
tle VII claim “arises under” federal law while a garden-variety 
state negligence claim does not. And it seems true today that the 
difficult cases, those that involve embedded questions of federal 
law under Grable, for instance, are the outliers rather than the 
usual cases.265 Regardless of whether we pick a clear or an unclear 
jurisdictional doctrine to resolve these questions, the doctrine 
picked almost certainly will resolve them correctly. 
When inaccuracy is less of a risk, clear and simple jurisdictional 
rules have substantial cost advantages over uncertain ones because 
they are easier to implement. For the easy cases, then, a clear juris-
dictional rule usually will be best. Narrowing the scope of the clear 
rule to the easy cases—in which underlying policies are less in con-
flict and the tasks of creating and implementing a clear rule are 
easier—is more feasible and justifiable than attempting to fit a sin-
gle clear rule to all cases. 
That does not mean that one must sacrifice the hard cases to the 
clear rule when inaccuracy becomes more of a concern at the mar-
gins. One could imagine, instead, designing a hybrid doctrine that 
uses a clear rule to address the easiest cases and an uncertain rule 
to address the harder cases, with a multitude of resulting benefits. 
The relatively narrow scope of the uncertain rule can restrict un-
certainty primarily to a small subset of cases, leaving clarity over 
the vast majority of cases and without sacrificing accuracy overall. 
 
263 Id. at 6. 
264 See 13D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3562 (3d 
ed. 2008) (“[T]he cases raising a serious question whether jurisdiction exists are com-
paratively rare.”); Friedman, supra note 94, at 56 (“Uncertainty tends to play itself 
out around the edges.”); Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841 (arguing that “hard 
cases . . . exist primarily at the margins” and “that the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictional questions are straightforward and readily resolved”). 
265 See Freer, supra note 53, at 342. That may not always have been the case. See 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 35, at 2153 (arguing that Grable-type claims were 
the norm in the nineteenth century). 
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And, for the clear rule’s cases, the clarity in the rule should be clear 
to lay persons as well and produce a similar clarity in results. The 
costs of uncertainty will remain for the other cases, at least for a 
time,266 but those will be a small subset, and that minimal cost may 
be outweighed by the resulting gains in accuracy. 
Institutionally, Congress and the courts can divide the burden of 
designing the rule into components based on their respective ca-
pacities: Congress can design the clear component that governs 
most cases (something that ought to be relatively easy even ex 
ante) and delegate to the courts the responsibility of designing the 
uncertain component for the hard cases, which may need more 
time and case-specific development. 
How might this actually look? I leave a comprehensive proposal 
for another day, but let me offer a preliminary, if oversimplistic, il-
lustration. Congress could incorporate the Holmes test as a test of 
inclusion in Section 1331 but leave the generalized “arising under” 
language available for other cases. Thus, the statute might include 
Section 1331(b), which would state, “For purposes of Section 
1331(a), a claim alleging a violation of a federally created right 
‘arises under’ federal law.”267 That would make clear the primacy of 
the Holmes test (and perhaps overrule troublesome cases like Bell 
v. Hood268 and Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter269) while authorizing 
the courts to continue the rarer and less certain Grable line of 
cases270 for more nuanced treatment of claims that might still justify 
the need for original federal jurisdiction. 
This is an easy illustration, I confess, and no doubt the use of hy-
brid rules in other areas will run into its own problems and difficul-
ties. Hybrid rules may prove to be as intractable as clear jurisdic-
 
266 It is a familiar hope that even uncertain doctrines will eventually result in greater 
clarity as the doctrine becomes concretized over time. See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 
546–47, 589 (arguing that discretionary doctrines tend to obtain clarity through the 
process of precedent-building); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 965 (“It is a familiar hope 
that standards will receive a degree of specification as they are interpreted . . . .”); cf. 
Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1907 (arguing that the Younger abstention doctrine devel-
oped “relatively determinate boundaries” over the course of “a reasonably short 
time”). 
267 My thanks to Jay Tidmarsh for a friendly amendment to this language. 
268 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
269 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
270 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 
(2005); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
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tional rules. But there are reasons to believe that hybrid rules have 
some promise, and at least more promise than unified clear juris-
dictional rules. The first step toward finding out is in acknowledg-
ing that overarching clarity in jurisdictional rules is inherently 
complex, difficult, and, in most cases, illusory. 
CONCLUSION 
Henry Adams once denounced simplicity as “the most deceitful 
mistress that ever betrayed man.”271 I have tried here to show that 
the ideal of simple and clear jurisdictional rules is deceptively 
complex and uncertain. And, at the very least, we ought to be skep-
tical of the mantra of clear and simple jurisdictional rules. 
Perhaps I am biased—academics tend to have a preference for 
the complex because, well, it gives us something to write and talk 
about.272 But I have tried to acknowledge that jurisdictional clarity 
and simplicity do have their place. They just need a narrower scope 
to be able to accomplish what they have the capacity to accom-
plish. The same goes for jurisdictional complexity and uncertainty: 
they can be used appropriately as well. The real value will come 
from using both sets of features together in their respective roles. 
 
 
271 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 441 (1918). 
272 Schuck, supra note 73, at 34–38. 
